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ABSTRACT
Financial frictions are a central element of most of the models that the literature on emerging
markets crises has proposed for explaining the ‘Sudden Stop’ phenomenon.  To date, few studies have
aimed to examine the quantitative implications of these models and to integrate them with an equilibrium
business cycle framework for emerging economies.  This paper surveys these studies viewing them as
ability-to-pay and willingness-to-pay variations of a framework that adds occasionally binding borrowing
constraints to the small open economy real-business-cycle model.  A common feature of the different
models is that agents factor in the risk of future Sudden Stops in their optimal plans, so that equilibrium
allocations and prices are distorted even when credit constraints do not bind.  Sudden Stops are a property
of the unique, flexible-price competitive equilibrium of these models that occurs in a particular region
of the state space in which negative shocks make borrowing constraints bind.  The resulting nonlinear
effects imply that solving the models requires non-linear numerical methods, which are described in the
survey.  The results show that the models can yield relatively infrequent Sudden Stops with large current
account reversals and deep recessions nested within smoother business cycles.  Still, research in this area
is at an early stage and this survey aims to stimulate further work.
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1.   Introduction 
  The severity of the financial and economic crisis that hit Mexico after the devaluation of 
the peso in December of 1994, and the unprecedented “Tequila Effect” by which Mexico’s 
financial woes “infected” emerging markets worldwide were a harbinger of a period of intense 
turbulence in international capital markets.  Seven years later, in December 2001 a major crisis 
broke out in Argentina with an explosive combination of sovereign default, massive currency 
devaluation and collapse of production and aggregate demand.  In the seven years separating 
these two crises, similar crises engulfed nearly all of the so-called “emerging markets,” including 
Hong Kong, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Russia, Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, and 
Turkey.  Interestingly, devaluation itself proved not to be a prerequisite for these crises, as 
illustrated by the experiences of Argentina in 1995, Hong Kong in 1997 or Chile in 1999.  
Contagion effects similar to the Tequila Effect were also a recurrent phenomenon, as crises 
spread quickly to the capital markets of countries with no apparent economic linkages to 
countries in crisis.  A favorite example is the correction in U.S. equity prices in the Fall of 1998 
that resulted from the wave of margin calls on global investors triggered by the Russian default.  
The systemic nature of this correction forced the U.S. Federal Reserve to lower interest rates and 
coordinate the orderly collapse of hedge fund Long Term Capital Management.   
  Emerging-markets crises are characterized by a set of striking empirical regularities that 
Calvo (1998) labeled the “Sudden Stop” phenomenon.  These empirical regularities include: (a) a 
sudden loss of access to international capital markets, (b) a large reversal of the current account 
deficit, (c) a collapse of domestic production and aggregate demand, and (d) sharp corrections in 
asset prices and in the prices of non-traded goods relative to traded goods.  Figures 1-3 illustrate   2
some of these stylized facts for Argentina, Korea, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
1  Figure 1 shows 
recent time series data for each country’s current account as a share of GDP.  Sudden Stops are 
displayed in these plots as sudden, large swings of the current account that in most cases 
exceeded five percentage points of GDP.  Figure 2 shows data on consumption growth as an 
indicator of real economic activity.  These plots show that Sudden Stops are associated with a 
collapse in the real sector of the economy.  Figure 3 provides information on two key financial 
indicators for each country, the price of domestic equity (valued in U.S. dollars) and the spread 
of the yield in JP Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) for each country 
relative to U.S. Treasury bills.  Large declines in equity prices and sudden, sharp increases in 
EMBI+ spreads are features of Sudden Stops, with equity prices often leading the surge of the 
EMBI+ spread at the monthly frequency.   
The Sudden Stops phenomenon is seriously at odds with the predictions of the majority 
of existing models of current account determination and business cycles in small open 
economies, both frictionless Real Business Cycle (RBC) models and models with nominal 
rigidities.  In these models, international capital markets provide the means for small open 
economies to borrow in order to smooth consumption when “bad” states of nature materialize, 
and to share the risk of their idiosyncratic income fluctuations with the rest of the world.  A 
country’s sudden loss of access to international capital markets is ruled out by assumption.  
Moreover, while RBC models have been successful at accounting for several features of regular 
business cycles in small open economies (see Mendoza (1991a) and (1994) and Correia, Neves 
                                                           
1Calvo and Reinhart (1999) and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000) document in detail the reversals 
of capital inflows and the sharp contractions in economic activity associated with Sudden Stops.  
The document by the International Monetary Fund (1999) documents the collapses in equity 
prices and the increase in their volatility.  Mendoza (2002) and Parsley (2000) show evidence of 
sharp changes in the relative price of nontradables for Hong Kong, Korea and Mexico.   3
and Rebelo (1995)), they cannot account for the large magnitude of the collapses in output, 
consumption and investment, and the large adjustment in relative prices, observed during a 
Sudden Stop.  Similarly, general-equilibrium asset pricing models have difficulties in accounting 
for the observed large asset price declines and for the contagion of asset price volatility across 
countries.  
  The pressing need to gain a better understanding of the Sudden Stops phenomenon has 
led to the development of an active research program seeking to build models that can deliver 
predictions consistent with this phenomenon (see, for example, the November, 1996 and June, 
2000 symposia issues of the Journal of International Economics or the NBER volumes edited by 
Edwards (2000), Krugman (2000a) and Frankel and Edwards (2002)).  The initial step of this 
research program was to recognize that an analytical framework that aims to explain the 
empirical regularities of emerging markets crises requires a reconsideration of the conventional 
approach to model international capital markets as a perfect mechanism for consumption 
smoothing, risk sharing and credit allocation (see Calvo and Mendoza (1996)).  Moreover, since 
international capital markets across industrial countries are much less volatile than emerging 
markets, it was also important to identify at the outset factors that may explain why emerging 
capital markets are significantly more prone to fail than the capital markets of industrial 
countries (see Krugman (2000b) and Calvo and Mendoza (2000a) and (2000b)).   Thus, the 
common starting point of much of the literature on emerging markets crises has been to model 
international capital markets as subject to a variety of financial-market imperfections and to 
attribute these imperfections to various forms of informational frictions that are more pervasive 
in emerging markets than in industrial-country capital markets.  Most of the literature focuses on 
theoretical partial-equilibrium models that yield qualitative results consistent with some of the   4
features that define a Sudden Stop.  Very little is known yet about whether these models provide 
a reasonable quantitative account of a typical emerging markets crisis.   
  The main objective of this paper is to analyze a framework that aims to integrate some of 
the financial-frictions channels proposed in the recent literature on emerging markets crises with 
an equilibrium business cycle model for small open economies.  The emphasis is on developing 
methods for deriving the quantitative implications of the proposed framework and on using these 
quantitative methods to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of financial-frictions theories 
of the Sudden Stop phenomenon.  The paper also provides a short survey of the recent literature 
with the aim of highlighting the differences between the alternative financial transmission 
mechanisms that have been proposed. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 surveys the recent literature on credit-
frictions models of Sudden Stops.  Section 3 proposes a basic macroeconomic framework for 
integrating financial frictions into RBC models of the small open economy.  Section 4 reviews 
four applications of this framework.  Section 5 concludes and discusses several venues for 
further research. 
2.   Varieties of Credit Frictions 
  A large portion of the recent literature on emerging markets crises proposes financial 
transmission mechanisms that can be roughly divided into two categories.  First, a group of 
studies explore financial transmission mechanisms driven by a debtor’s ability to pay.  In these 
models, debtors may be willing to repay their debts but their ability to do so is threatened by the 
realization of “bad” states of nature.  Creditors aim to cover their exposure to this default risk by 
imposing lending conditions on borrowers (usually in the form of collateral or liquidity 
requirements) or by choosing to incur monitoring costs to assess a borrower’s claim not to be   5
able to repay.  The second category emphasizes a debtor’s willingness to pay.  In these models, 
debtors decide optimally to renege on their debts when the expected lifetime payoff of 
defaulting, net of any default penalty, exceeds the expected lifetime payoff of repaying.   
  Most of the work published to date in both of the above categories is theoretical in nature 
and is based in part on the related literature on financial frictions and contract theory in 
Macroeconomics, International Macroeconomics and Finance produced in the last two decades.  
Note also that the two-category classification is a natural way or organizing the literature but it 
hides the fact that several of the models that have been proposed combine elements of ability and 
willingness to pay (costly monitoring models, for example, have elements of both ability to pay 
and willingness to pay since they deal with the inability of a lender to tell if a defaulting 
borrower is unable to pay or unwilling to pay without incurring the monitoring cost). 
2.1   Ability-to-pay Models 
  Models driven by ability to pay generally specify explicit constraints linking a country’s 
ability to acquire debt to the dynamics of income and prices or to various forms of collateral.  
The motivation for these constraints comes from the lenders’ interest in managing default risk 
and from informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders.  
  Calvo (1998) presents a very clear characterization of an ability-to-pay framework as a 
mechanism for explaining Sudden Stops.  He considers a perfect-foresight, three-period small 
open economy with traded and nontraded goods that are separable in utility.  An endowment of 
traded goods is received only in the last period and production of nontraded goods is planned at 
date 0, using a linear technology in which tradables enter as an input and output is obtained a 
period later.  Thus, at date 0 firms borrow to import tradables to use as input in nontradables 
production acting on a perceived relative price for nontradables sold at date 1.  At date 1,   6
tradables and nontradables are consumed, producers’ debt is due and new debt is contracted to 
import tradables for consumption.  At date 2, tradables are consumed and debt is paid.  In this 
economy, the Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium free of credit-market imperfections obtains 
when the date-0 perceived nontradables relative price equals the actual date-1 equilibrium price.  
Firms are always able to repay their debt.   
  The outcome differs sharply if there is a temporary shock to the country’s ability to 
access capital markets in period 1, once production plans are implemented, and there are fixed 
bankruptcy costs that increase the real cost of servicing debt at date 2.  In this case, the 
competitive equilibrium yields two mutually-consistent outcomes.  On one hand, there is 
bankruptcy, that is firms become unable to repay their debt.  On the other hand, the equilibrium 
relative price of nontradables is lower than the perceived date-0 price.  This occurs because 
bankruptcy costs lower the permanent income of the economy and thus the consumption of 
tradables at dates 1 and 2.  The decline in tradables consumption at date 1 induces a fall in the 
marginal rate of substitution between nontradables and tradables, and hence in the equilibrium 
relative price of nontradables.  This price decline renders firms bankrupt because they made 
zero-profits production plans at the higher Pareto-optimal price perceived at date 0.   
  The shock to credit market access and the bankruptcy costs are both central to Calvo’s 
story.  If firms cannot roll over their debt temporarily but bankruptcy does not entail costs, 
households could borrow to cover the firms’ obligations (assuming unlimited-liability firms) and 
the Pareto-optimal equilibrium would prevail.  This model is highly stylized but its main 
prediction (i.e., that large, unexpected relative price changes induced by credit frictions can 
trigger Sudden Stops) is robust to several modifications in terms of the life horizon, the form of 
the utility function, and the tradables endowment process.  Mendoza (2002), for example,   7
considers an RBC-like, two-sector model that delivers similar findings by introducing a 
borrowing constraint set in terms of a fraction of gross domestic product in units of tradables 
(this model is discussed in Section 4.1 below). 
  Ability-to-pay models of Sudden Stops based on collateral constraints typically 
emphasize constraints analogous to the well-known collateral constraint studied by Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997).  In these models, foreign debt is constrained not to exceed the discounted 
liquidation value of the capital stock one period into the future.  Models of this class include 
those of Izquierdo (2000), Edison, Luangaram and Miller (2000) and Paasche (2001).   
  Izquierdo (2000) and Edison, Luangaram and Miller (2000) use Kiyotaki-Moore (KM) 
constraints to study how this credit-market friction could explain the large real effects observed 
during the Tequila and East Asian crises. They find that the response of credit-constrained 
economies to financial shocks, such as a fall of the exchange rate, can greatly amplify the real 
effects of these shocks and lead to systemic financial collapse.  Izquierdo argues that these 
magnification effects lead to an asymmetric response relative to what is observed when positive 
shocks hit the economy, and shows evidence of asymmetric responses in a panel for Latin 
America.  Paasche (2001) examines the extent to which a crisis in a country can spread to 
another seemingly unrelated country, when two small open economies that face K-M constraints 
export differentiated goods to a large country.  An adverse, temporary terms-of-trade shock 
triggered by a productivity shock to one of the small economies causes large capital outflows and 
a rapid deterioration in the current account of the other small economy.     
  Other studies make use of collateral constraints that differ from the K-M constraint.  
These include Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Auernhaimer and Garcia-Saltos (2000), 
Schneider and Tornell (1999), Christiano, Guts and Roldos (2001) and Mendoza and Smith   8
(2001).  A common feature of these studies is that they produce collateral-based financial 
transmission mechanisms that magnify the real effects of macroeconomic shocks. Caballero and 
Krishnamurty focus on differences across domestic industries in their ability to offer “useful” 
collateral to international lenders.  Auernheimer and Garcia-Saltos link the cost of borrowing 
explicitly to the market value of the capital stock, as a form of implicit collateral.  Schneider and 
Tornell study the interaction of collateral constraints that comprise land, a fraction of risky 
capital and a fraction of bonds, with government bailouts guarantees.  Christiano et al. and 
Mendoza and Smith study collateral constraints that depend on the current liquidation value of 
assets, a form of collateral constraint often referred to as a margin requirement (see Aiyagari and 
Gertler (1999)). 
  Quantitative applications of ability-to-pay models in an RBC setting are rare (some 
examples are presented in Section 4), but there are numerical results for some of the models cited 
above for perfect-foresight experiments.  Paasche (2001) and Auernheimer and Garcia Saltos 
(2000) study simulations of their models to explore the magnitude of the real effects they can 
produce in response to unanticipated shocks.  Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2001) and Cespedes, 
Chang and Velasco (2001) develop quantitative models aimed at answering policy questions.  
Christiano et al. study how a change in the domestic interest rate affects output when a small 
open economy runs into a binding collateral constraint by which debt is constrained not to 
exceed a fraction of the current value of domestic assets.  Firms require two types of working 
capital: domestic currency to hire domestic inputs and foreign currency to finance imports of an 
intermediate input.  Borrowers and lenders do not anticipate the possibility of the suddenly-
binding borrowing constraint hitting the economy, so the constraint emerges as an unanticipated 
shock to a perfect-foresight equilibrium as in the experiments of Paasche and Auernheimer and   9
Garcia-Saltos.  In this setting, an interest rate cut can produce a fall in the value of domestic 
assets via a nominal exchange-rate depreciation, which in turn reduces imports of the foreign 
input.  If the foreign input is not very substitutable for domestically-produced inputs, a 
contraction in output follows.  Depending on how labor enters in production and how it responds 
to the interest rate cut, however, the model can also predict that an expansion could follow from 
the interest rate cut.   
  Cespedes et al. (2001) consider a setup of monitoring costs analogous to the Bernanke-
Gertler financial accelerator model to study the relation among exchange rate regimes, balance-
sheet effects, nominal rigidities and macroeconomic outcomes.  In their model, balance-sheet 
effects magnify the adverse real effects of a foreign shock that triggers a real devaluation of the 
currency.  However, these real effects are always larger with a fixed exchange rate than with a 
flexible one because the former does not help the economy cope with nominal rigidities and 
makes no difference for the nature of the Bernanke-Gertler external financing premium. 
  From the perspective of developing an equilibrium business cycle approach to explain 
Sudden Stops, the above literature on ability-to-pay models faces two challenges.  One is that in 
the majority of the existing models borrowing constraints are always binding along an 
equilibrium path.  This rules out equilibrium dynamics in which one can observe large reversals 
of the current account triggered by a switch from a state of nature in which the constraint did not 
bind to one in which it does (as implicit in Calvo’s (1998) setup).  The second shortcoming is 
that most models deal with perfect-foresight experiments in which the credit constraint arrives as 
an unexpected shock.  Hence, economic agents are not given the opportunity to adapt their 
optimal plans to the possibility of being suddenly unable to access international capital markets. 
As shown later, optimal plans differ sharply even if the probability of this event is negligible.   10
2.2   Willingness-to-pay Models 
  The literature on international debt that emphasizes willingness to pay was very active in 
the aftermath of the developing-country debt crisis of the 1980s, and is now going through a 
renaissance motivated both by the emerging markets crises and the recent developments in 
closed-economy finance theory.  The premise in this literature is that credit markets are 
intrinsically fragile because, in the absence of efficient mechanisms for committing debtors to 
fulfill their obligations, debtors optimally choose to default whenever the lifetime payoff of 
doing so exceeds the payoff of continuing in a credit relationship.  However, the implications of 
this incentive-compatibility or participation constraint vary depending on the structure of the 
economic environment on which it is imposed.   
  Consider first the classic article on sovereign default by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) in 
which a sovereign debtor in default faces permanent exclusion of international capital markets 
(i.e., consumption must be set at the same level of the economy’s income endowment each 
period).  Eaton and Gerosvitz set this debtor in a global credit market with fully-informed, risk-
neutral lenders that are willing to lend at a default-risk premium that equates the expected return 
on risky sovereign debt with that of a riskless asset (up to a maximum lending ceiling).  The 
default risk premium is an endogenous outcome that reflects the probability that borrowers find 
themselves in states of nature at which it is optimal to default because the participation constraint 
fails.  Default is observed at equilibrium when these states occur. 
  Atkeson (1991) considers a model in which the participation constraint interacts with a 
moral hazard problem in a contracting environment in which repayment schedules are contingent 
on output realizations.  In particular, lenders cannot observe whether borrowed funds are used for 
investment or consumption.  The optimal contract features capital outflows from the borrowing   11
country as a solution to the moral hazard problem. 
  The above studies assume that countries cannot enter into other financial agreements after 
they renege on their debts, and thus that financial autarky is a credible threat.  However, a key 
lingering question facing this literature is whether creditors really posses the ability to penalize 
debtors in this way.  Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that a sufficient condition for the 
reputational mechanism implicit in satisfying the participation constraint to fail to enforce debt 
repayments is that countries in default may have access to a rich set of deposit contracts with 
foreign creditors.  Thus, a country that has large expected repayments due can default and then 
save the resources at stake in deposit contracts, thereby enjoying a higher level of consumption 
(and utility) thereafter.  Rational lenders foresee this outcome and so international borrowing 
cannot be sustained in equilibrium.   
  The Bulow-Rogoff paradox has been addressed in different ways.  Bulow and Rogoff 
(1989) provided an answer based on the notion that lenders may be able to impose direct trade 
sanctions on defaulting borrowers.  More recently, Kletzer and Wright (2000) proposed an 
environment in which both lenders and borrowers lack capacity of commitment.  This limits the 
set of deposit contracts that defaulting economies have access to if they default.  The authors 
show how the two-side commitment problem they study can restore sustainable intertemporal 
exchange through reputation by constructing a renegotiation–proof equilibrium where payments 
are state contingent and contracts are incentive-compatible for both parties.  Finally, Wright 
(2001) looks at how a country’s concern for reputation can work to enforce repayment when 
there are also reputational incentives on the side of lenders that lead them to tacitly collude in 
punishing a country in default.  If syndicated lending is allowed, banks collude to punish 
countries in default so as to preserve their own reputation for cooperation.    12
  Quantitative applications of willingness-to-pay models applied to the study of Sudden 
Stops are as rare as those of the ability-to-pay models.  Most of the literature focuses on 
examining theoretically the strategic interaction of borrowers and lenders and the properties of 
the resulting incentive-compatible contract, although some quantitative applications of models in 
this class do exist.  Perri and Kehoe (2001) study business cycle co-movements across industrial 
countries in a two-country model in which each country is required to satisfy its participation 
constraint in each state of nature, following the closed-economy analysis of Kehoe and Levine 
(1993) and Kocherlakota (1996).   From the perspective of emerging markets crises, however, 
this modeling approach has difficulties in accounting for defaults because the need to satisfy the 
participation constraints at all times rules them out at equilibrium.
2  Also, depending on 
preference and technology parameters and on the stochastic structure of the shocks hitting the 
economy, these models can predict that the incentives for default tend to be stronger for 
countries that are in good states of nature or that experience less macroeconomic volatility. 
  Hamann (2002) studies the quantitative implications of the Eaton-Gersovitz framework 
and he does explore its ability to account for some features of emerging markets crises, albeit in 
the context of a pure exchange economy.  He shows how increased persistence or variance in the 
endowment income process can reproduce some features of a Sudden Stop in which borrowing 
constraints are tightened and the default risk premium is increased.  To do so, he exploits the 
feedback between these changes in the income process, the equilibrium probability of default, 
and the optimizing behavior of the risk-neutral lenders assumed in the Eaton-Gersovitz model. 
  In summary, the growing literature studying emerging markets crises from the ability- 
and willingness-to-pay approaches has made important contributions to our understanding of the 
                                                           
2 In these models there can be states of nature in which borrowers and lenders agree to a zero 
payment but always as part of the contract that enforces the incentive compatibility constraint.   13
process that drives Sudden Stops.  Related studies that have examined Sudden Stops as the 
outcome of self-fulfilling expectations, informational cascades, or working capital distortions 
(see, for example, Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee, (2000) Calvo (2000), Chari and Kehoe 
(2002), Cole and Kehoe (1996), Reif (2001), Neumeyer and Perri (2001) and Oviedo (2002)) 
have also made valuable contributions.  Yet, little is still known about the quantitative 
implications of these models in an equilibrium business cycle setting, and about whether the 
financial transmission channels they propose offer a quantitatively plausible account of the 
Sudden Stop phenomenon.  In the next two sections we describe an equilibrium business cycle 
framework with financial frictions that tries to make some progress in this regard. 
3.   Real Business Cycles in Small Open Economies with Financial Frictions 
  This Section proposes a modification of the standard RBC framework for the small open 
economy that introduces financial frictions.  The standard small-open-economy RBC model (as 
in Mendoza (1991a)) features a representative infinitely-lived household, a representative firm 
operating a neoclassical production technology subject to random productivity disturbances and 
facing capital-adjustment costs, and an international credit market of one-period, non-contingent 
bonds.  In this model, markets of contingent claims are incomplete but the credit market is 
perfect (i.e., the small open economy can borrow or lend at the world-determined real interest 
rate any amount that is consistent with the household’s no-Ponzi-game condition). 
  In addition to the above assumptions, small open economy RBC models typically require 
extra assumptions regarding the nature of intertemporal preferences or international bond 
markets in order to support a well-defined stochastic stationary state from which to compute 
business cycle moments that can be compared to moments in the data.  It is well-known that 
deterministic small-open-economy models, with standard time-separable preferences featuring   14
an exogenous rate of time preference and the standard global credit market with an exogenous 
interest rate, yield either explosive dynamics (if the rate of time preference and the interest rate 
differ) or stationary equilibria that depend on initial conditions (if the rate of time preference and 
the interest rate are identical).  Obstfeld (1981) showed how preferences with an endogenous rate 
of time preference could be used to obtain well-defined foreign asset accumulation dynamics 
(with a unique steady state independent of initial conditions) in a perfect foresight small-open-
economy model.  Similarly, the RBC model in Mendoza (1991a) used preferences with 
endogenous discounting in order to obtain a well-defined limiting distribution of foreign assets.   
In stochastic environments, intertemporal preferences with an endogenous rate of time 
preference take the form of Epstein’s (1983) Stationary Cardinal Utility (SCU) function: 
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In this expression, u(.) is a standard twice-continuously-differentiable and concave utility 
function and v(.) is the time preference function, which is assumed to be increasing, concave and 
twice-continuously-differentiable.  SCU also imposes restrictions linking the two functions that 
can be interpreted as setting an upper bound on the elasticity of the rate of time preference with 
respect to the argument of utility.  These restrictions imply that the impatience effect, by which 
changes in date-t consumption alter the rate at which all future utility flows are discounted, must 
be “small” (in the sense that the rate of time preference, exp(v(.)), is increasing in the argument 
of utility but maintaining the condition that  1( )exp( ( )) uv ×- × is non-increasing).  This is necessary 
in order to ensure that consumption at every date is a normal good and that the model supports a 
well-defined unique, invariant limiting distribution (see Epstein (1983)). 
Endogenous discounting is not the only method used to obtain a unique, invariant   15
limiting distribution in stochastic small-open-economy models.  Other methods explored in the 
literature include finitely-lived households (i.e., Blanchard preferences), transactions costs in 
foreign assets, and ad-hoc interest rate functions that link the rate of interest to the stock of 
foreign debt.  Moreover, since the small-open-economy RBC model has only one non-state-
contingent asset and hence features non-insurable, idiosyncratic risk, the model is in the class of 
incomplete-markets models for which precautionary savings can yield a well-defined stochastic 
steady state even with an exogenous discount factor (as long as the rate of time preference is set 
higher than the world interest rate, see Chapter 14 in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000)). 
Some of these alternative methods can yield similar results as the endogenous discount 
factor in particular log-linear quantitative applications (see Schmittt-Grohe and Uribe (2001)), 
but this equivalence is unlikely to hold in models that aim to capture a Sudden Stop’s large, non-
linear adjustments.  In addition, Epstein’s utility function is the only formulation consistent with 
three standard features of RBC models: economic agents are infinitely-lived, the rate of time 
preference and the rate of interest are equal in the long run, and the long-run foreign asset 
position is determined by the interaction of household preferences with the real interest rate and 
not by ad-hoc specifications of transactions-costs or interest-rate functions.  Moreover, Epstein 
(1983) showed that SCU as a representation of a preference order requires weaker axioms of 
consumer theory than the ones required by time-separable utility with exogenous discounting.   
In the context of models with financial frictions, preferences with endogenous 
discounting have the extra advantage that they allow for the possibility that credit constraints can 
remain binding at steady state.  This is because a binding credit constraint drives a wedge 
between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption and the rate of interest.  
In a stationary state with a binding credit constraint the rate of time preference adjusts   16
endogenously to accommodate this wedge.  In contrast, in models with an exogenous discount 
factor credit constraints never bind in the long run (if the exogenous rate of time preference is set 
greater or equal than the world interest rate) or must always bind at steady state (if the rate of 
time preference is fixed below the interest rate). 
  The recursive representation of the competitive equilibrium of the small-open-economy 
RBC model is characterized by optimal decision rules for the vector  [] ,, yc n i = of control 
variables (where c is consumption, n is labor supply, and i=k’-k(1-d) is gross investment) and the 
vector  [] , xk b ¢¢ ¢ = of endogenous states (where k’ is  capital accumulation and b’ is foreign asset 
accumulation) that solve the following dynamic-programming form of a planner’s problem: 
  [] { }
’, ’, , ( , , ) max ( , ) exp( ( , )) ( , , )
s . t .     (,) ( 1 ) (, )
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 (2) 
where  f(.)  is a neoclassical production function, d  is the rate of depreciation of the capital stock, 
j is a convex capital-adjustment-cost function, R is the world’s gross real interest rate and e is a 
productivity disturbance that follows a Markov process with a known transition probability 
matrix.  The initial state of the system is given by the observed realization of e and by the vector 
[] , xk b = , where k is the initial capital stock and b the initial net foreign asset position. 
  The above social planner’s problem can be decentralized in standard fashion to establish 
the equivalence between the planner’s problem and the competitive equilibrium of an economy 
in which households own the factors of production and rent them out to profit-maximizing firms.  
The prices and factor rental rates that support equilibrium allocations include the wage rate, w, 
the rental rate of capital, r, and the relative price of investment goods in terms of consumption 
goods, q – which is not equal to 1 because of the capital-adjustment costs.  The price vector that   17
households and firms take as given is thus defined by  [] ,, pw r q = . 
Consider now a modification of the above economic environment in which financial 
markets are imperfect.  The first change to notice is that, since financial frictions distort the 
competitive equilibrium, it may be necessary to study the equilibria of these economies directly 
in decentralized form.  Alternatively, it may be possible to construct a variant of a planning 
problem that captures the distortions induced by specific forms of financial-market imperfections 
on the competitive equilibrium (as in the applications studied in Section 4). 
  This paper focuses on financial frictions that reduce to functional constraints on the small 
open economy’s ability to contract foreign debt of the following form: 
  (,,, ,) bh k x y e p ¢¢ ³  (3) 
This state-contingent borrowing constraint is not formally derived as a feature of an optimal 
credit contract between the small open economy and its international creditors.  However, the 
next section’s review of four applications of this framework relates explicit forms of the 
borrowing constraint to existing results for optimal credit contracts or to observed practice in 
actual credit markets.  The above specification is general enough to include a broad range of 
applications, including liquidity requirements, margin constraints, borrowing ceilings set to 
support debt repayment incentives, and collateral constraints set to the current liquidation value 
of assets.  One exception is the Kiyotaki-Moore collateral constraint, which depends on future 
realizations of an element of p (the next period’s equity price).
3 
  The appropriate planner’s-problem representation of the borrowing constraint can be 
derived once explicit functional forms for the financial frictions affecting households and/or 
                                                           
3 Despite this limitation, other collateral constraints that are included in h, like margin 
requirements, have similar asset-pricing implications as Kiyotaki-Moore constraints (see 
Mendoza and Smith (2001) for details).   18
firms in the decentralized competitive equilibrium are defined.  For example, the planner’s 
borrowing constraint may represent a constraint limiting households’ foreign debt not to exceed 
a fraction of factor income or firms’ ability to leverage their debt on the value of their capital.  
Under particular assumptions, the competitive equilibria of economies with these constraints can 
be shown to be equivalent to that of a planning problem in which debt is limited not to exceed a 
fraction of output or a fraction of the market value of the capital stock.  In general, however, 
whether such equivalence between competitive equilibria and a planner’s problem exists needs to 
be examined case by case. 
  At this level of generality it is possible to extract some important properties of small-
open-economy RBC models that incorporate the above borrowing constraint: 
(1) The borrowing constraint is “occasionally binding.”  Whether the constraint binds or not 
depends ultimately on the initial state (x,e).  Note that since the equilibrium is represented 
in recursive, social-planner’s form, the optimal decision rules for k’ and y and the 
equilibrium pricing vector p in the right-hand-side of (2) are also functions of x and e. 
(2)  The dynamics of the borrowing constraint and equilibrium allocations and prices feature 
endogenous feedback effects.  Knowledge that the constraint is a feature of the financial 
markets in which the small open economy participates, influences the optimal forward-
looking plans that economic agents formulate. As a result, it also influences the 
equilibrium dynamics of prices and allocations, which in turn determine whether the 
constraint binds or not.  In particular, the agents’ expectations that they may face future 
states in which the borrowing constraint can bind influences their decisions to accumulate 
assets today and thus the probability that the constraint can actually bind in the future. 
(3) Suddenly-binding borrowing constraints can produce non-linear dynamics and country-  19
specific risk premia.  When the economy switches from a state in which the constraint 
does not bind to a state in which it binds, there are discrete jumps upward in the effective 
intertemporal relative price of current consumption and downward (upward) in the level 
of current (future) consumption.  This follows from the household’s consumption Euler 
equation, which takes the form: 
  [] ER llm ¢¢ =+  (4) 
where  l is the lifetime marginal utility of consumption (i.e. the non-negative Lagrange 
multiplier on the resource constraint facing the planner) and m is the non-negative 
Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint.  The increased effective real interest 
rate in the states in which the borrowing constraint binds represents an endogenous, 
country-specific risk premium on external financing.   
(4) The borrowing constraint can depress asset prices and trigger Fisherian debt-deflation 
dynamics.  As shown in the next Section, the higher effective interest rates implied by 
either a currently-binding or expected-future-binding borrowing constraint depresses 
current equity prices by increasing the discount rates relevant for discounting dividend 
streams in the valuation of assets.  If the specification of h(.) links the borrowing 
constraint to asset prices, the adverse asset-pricing implications of the constraint add a 
feedback effect in the spirit of Fisher’s debt deflation mechanism: an initial shock 
triggers the borrowing constraint, this leads to a decline in asset prices, which then leads 
to an even tighter borrowing constraint and thus a downward spiral on asset prices and 
access to foreign financing. 
  An important implication of these four properties is that the small-open-economy RBC 
framework with borrowing constraints is endowed with a self-adjustment mechanism that   20
actually works to weaken the quantitative effects of financial frictions.  That mechanism is the 
precautionary savings motive: Risk-averse agents respond to their non-insurable exposure to the 
risk of a binding borrowing limit, which adversely affects their consumption plans, by 
accumulating a buffer stock of assets.  Precautionary savings can also distort portfolio choice in 
models in which foreign assets co-exist with other vehicles of saving such as physical capital or 
equity.  As mentioned earlier, this precautionary-savings effect is already present in the 
frictionless small-open-economy RBC model because the non-contingent international bond 
cannot fully insure agents against country-specific idiosyncratic income shocks.  The effect is 
stronger in the presence of borrowing constraints, however, because agents in the frictionless 
model could rely on a perfect international credit market to support optimal consumption plans 
and they have the option of using domestic investment as an alternative savings vehicle.
4 
  Dealing with the precautionary savings motive is an important unfinished task for the 
literature on financial frictions in small open economies.  The majority of models of the Sudden 
Stops phenomenon abstract from it by assuming perfect foresight or by focusing on experiments 
in which the financial frictions are a negative unanticipated shock to the economic environment.  
Thus, in these experiments economic agents are not allowed to condition their behavior on the 
possibility of the occurrence of states of nature in which they are forced out of international 
capital markets.  While this assumption has proven useful for obtaining insightful analytical 
results, it is important to relax it in order to integrate financial frictions into equilibrium business 
cycle models for small open economies.   
In principle, precautionary savings may seem reason to cast doubt on the potential of 
models with financial frictions to offer a quantitatively significant account of the empirical 
                                                           
4 Mendoza (1991b) shows that, in the standard small open economy RBC model, agents can 
adjust investment and suffer a negligible welfare loss even if they are forced out of the world   21
regularities of emerging markets crises.  Yet, precautionary savings are in fact a key property of 
these models that enables them to mimic an observed feature of the data: Sudden Stops are 
dramatic but relatively rare.  The cyclical downturns experienced in countries that have suffered 
Sudden Stops were large, but they were also abnormally large relative to those countries’ regular 
business cycles (see Mendoza (2002) and Calvo and Reinhart (2001)).  Thus, it seems natural to 
think of designing equilibrium business cycle models that aim to explain Sudden Stops by 
nesting these dramatic, rare events within more a regular business cycle pattern.
5  It is 
undesirable to follow an approach with two disconnected theories of economic fluctuations for 
emerging economies, one for Sudden Stops and one for tranquil times, in which key assumptions 
regarding the ability of agents to condition their behavior on the possibility of the economy 
suddenly losing access to world capital markets in the future are emphasized in the former but 
dismissed in the latter.  
4.   Applications 
  This Section of the paper reviews four applications of the general framework proposed in 
Section 3 that aim to capture financial frictions similar to those emphasized in the literature on 
emerging-markets crises.  The first application considers a liquidity requirement that at 
equilibrium represents a constraint on the debt-to-output ratio of a two-sector economy (this 
model is borrowed from Mendoza (2002)).  The liquidity requirement incorporates the 
phenomenon known as “liability dollarization:” foreign debt is denominated in units of tradable 
goods but serviced in part with income generated in the nontradables sector, and hence large 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
credit market altogether. 
5 If Sudden Stops are nested as rare events within regular business cycles, the RBC approach to 
compare statistical moments of detrended data with the moments of the ergodic distribution of 
business cycle models is unlikely to be useful for studying Sudden Stops.   The next Section 
discusses one alternative approach that can be followed to study the models’ ability to explain 
Sudden Stops.   22
swings in the relative price of nontradables, or in the real exchange rate, can trigger binding 
borrowing constraints and sudden current account reversals.  The second application reviews the 
asset-pricing model of Mendoza and Smith (2001).  This model incorporates two financial 
frictions.  First, a friction in the international credit market analogous to a margin requirement by 
which a fraction of the value of equity holdings must be offered as collateral for foreign debt.  
Second, informational frictions in the equity market that result in transactions costs in trading the 
small open economy’s equity for foreign securities firms.  The third application looks at 
Arellano’s (2002) analysis of borrowing constraints that enforce credit-market participation 
constraints in an environment with incomplete insurance markets.  The fourth application 
considers a model with capital adjustment costs that features a collateral constraint similar to the 
margin requirement used in the asset-pricing model but in a setup with endogenous capital 
accumulation. Foreign creditors retain as collateral a fraction of the value of the economy’s 
capital stock where this value is determined by Tobin’s q. 
4.1  Liquidity Requirements and Liability Dollarization in a Two-Sector Economy 
  Consider a small open economy with two sectors, a tradable goods sector and a 
nontradable goods sector.  The output of tradables is a stochastic endowment exp(e)y
T, where e is 
random variable that follows a Markov process.  Non-tradable goods are produced using a Cobb-
Douglas production function 
1 ( , ) exp( ) Fkn A k n
aa e
- = , where A is a productivity scaling factor, n 
is variable labor input, k is the time-invariant capital stock, and 0<a<1 is the output share of 
labor income.  The production of nontradables is subject to productivity shocks, which are 
assumed to be perfectly correlated with the shocks to the tradables endowment for simplicity.   
  Private consumption of tradables (c
T) and nontradables (c
N) is aggregated into a 
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, where 0<w<1 and h>-1 are the standard CES parameters 
(1/(1+h) is the elasticity of substitution between c
T and c






- (with d> 1), which makes the marginal 
rate of substitution between n and c independent of the latter and sets the wage elasticity of labor 
supply equal to 1/(d-1).    
  The economy has access to a global credit market of one-period bonds (b) in which it acts 
as a small price-taker.  The world gross real interest rate exp( )
R R e  is subject to random shocks 
R e  which also follow a Markov process.  
  The government of the small open economy levies a consumption tax t  that is uniform 
across goods.  This tax is intended to capture some of the distortions that can result from fiscal, 
monetary and exchange-rate policies in models in which money enters as an argument of the 
utility function or as a means to economize transactions costs (see Mendoza (2001) and Mendoza 
and Uribe (2001) for details).  Private agents perceive tax policy as uncertain and thus attach 
positive probability to scenarios in which the economy can switch from low to high-tax regimes 
and vice versa.  Hence, the consumption tax is modeled as a standard regime-switching, 
asymmetric Markov process.  The government also maintains a constant level of unproductive 
purchases of nontradables financed by a time-invariant lump-sum tax 
N T .  This ensures that the 
dynamics of the relative price of nontradables (p
N) are driven only by changes in private-sector 
supply and demand choices and not by endogenous changes in government purchases due to 
fluctuations in tax revenue.  Fluctuations in tax revenue result in fluctuations of unproductive 
government purchases of tradable goods around a “trend” level financed also by a time-invariant   24
lump-sum tax 
T T .  This assumption introduces the Calvo-Drazen fiscal-induced wealth effects 
that Calvo and Drazen (1988) and Mendoza and Uribe (2001) found critical for explaining key 
features of economic fluctuations in developing countries exposed to the risk of uncertain 
duration of government policy. 
  The global credit market is imperfect.  In particular, the small open economy must satisfy 
a liquidity requirement by which a fraction f of current expenditures, tax and debt service 
obligations must be paid out of current income which is valued in the same units as debt 
contracts are written in (i.e., in units of tradable goods): 
  () ( ) 1 exp( )
TN N R TN N
tt t t t t t t t t t t wn c p c Rb T p T pf t e éù +³ + + - + + ëû  (5) 
Here,  w is the wage rate and p are rents on the time invariant capital stock paid by firms 
producing nontradables.  This liquidity requirement and the household’s budget constraint imply 
that the economy faces a borrowing constraint that limits debt not to exceed a fraction (1-f)/f  of 
household income in units of tradables: 
  [] 1
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  An intuitive motivation for this liquidity requirement is that it helps creditors to manage 
default risk because it is an ability-to-pay criterion that reduces the likelihood of observing 
situations in which the current income of borrowers falls short of what is needed to pay for 
existing debts.  This is accomplished by limiting the margin by which the borrowers’ current 
obligations can exceed their current income (i.e., by forcing borrowers to maintain a certain level 
of “liquidity”).  Borrowing constraints of this form are widely used by lenders in determining 
maximum loan amounts and setting borrowers’ qualification criteria, particularly in mortgage 
loans and consumer debt contracts.     25
  Despite its empirical appeal, the liquidity requirement is not modeled here as the outcome 
of an optimal contract between lenders and borrowers.  It is not optimal from the ability-to-pay 
standpoint because it does not fully ensure that debtors will have enough current income to repay 
their debts in every state of nature.  To do so, f would have to be contingent on bt and on the 
stochastic processes governing the exogenous shocks.   It is not optimal from the willingness-to-
pay perspective because it does not ensure that borrowers will satisfy their participation 
constraint.  These caveats imply that the use of the liquidity requirement is supported by two 
implicit participation assumptions.  First, contract-enforcing institutions are such that borrowers 
are committed to honor debt contracts that feature the liquidity requirement even if they find 
themselves in states of nature in which it is not incentive-compatible for them to do so.  Second, 
debt contracts with the liquidity requirement also commit lenders to lend even if the borrowers’ 
ability to repay out of current income in all future states is not guaranteed (i.e., debtors can 
always borrow at date t if they satisfy the liquidity requirement, even if at t+1 there are some 
states of nature in which their income net of current expenditures and taxes is lower than debt 
service obligations). 
  The borrowing constraint in (6) can be incorporated into a planner’s problem that yields a 
solution equivalent to the model’s competitive equilibrium.  Since factors earn their marginal 
products and factor payments exhaust output, the borrowing constraint in the planner’s problem 
adopts the form of a constraint that limits debt not to exceed the fraction (1-f)/f  of GDP valued 
at tradables goods prices.  Defining  () ,,
R y ee t º  as the triple of observed realizations of the 
exogenous shocks and adopting explicit functional forms for the period utility and time 
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Period utility is a standard constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function, with s  as the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  The time preference function is logarithmic and b represents 





+- .  The variables in “hats” 
represent solutions of a system of five nonlinear simultaneous equations in the five unknowns 
ee e ee   4. . CC C NP  ¯ ¢±  that satisfy a subset of the competitive equilibrium conditions for each coordinate 
() ,’ , bby  in the state space.  If the liquidity constraint (10) is not binding, the five equations are: 




(ii) the equilibrium condition equating the marginal rate of substitution between n and c
 with the 
effective real wage (i.e., the post-tax marginal product of labor in units of tradables, w/(1+t) p
c, 
where p
c is the CES relative price index of c in units of tradables, which is itself a monotonic, 
increasing function of p
N),  (iii) the market-clearing condition in the tradable goods market (eq. 
(8)), (iv) the market-clearing condition in the nontradable goods market (eq. (9)), and (v) the 
definition of the CES composite good c.  If the liquidity constraint is binding, (10) holds with 
equality and replaces the labor-consumption optimality condition.   27
  The Bellman equation in (7) can be solved using a variety of well-known value or policy 
function iteration methods.  One important caveat, however, is that policy-function-iteration 
methods based on linear interpolations and solution methods that use either approximately-linear 
or continuously-differentiable policy functions may perform poorly because of the nonlinearities 
or kinks in the decision rule for bt+1 implied by the occasionally-binding borrowing constraint.  
These kinks do not extend to the value function, which remains continuously differentiable and 
concave. 
  The transmission mechanism that drives economic fluctuations in this model combines 
features of RBC and policy uncertainty models, with the credit-channel mechanism induced by 
the liquidity requirement.  If the liquidity requirement never binds, the shocks to productivity and 
the world interest rate drive business cycles through the channels examined in the RBC literature 
for small open economies (see Mendoza (1991a) and (1995)).  Tax shocks add to these channels 
through the wealth and substitution effects highlighted in the studies on uncertain duration of 
economic policies by Calvo and Drazen (1998) and Mendoza and Uribe (2001).  Given a low tax 
at date t, the conditional expected tax for t+1 is higher than the tax observed at t.  This triggers 
an intertemporal substitution effect: prices are relatively low at t and hence agents substitute 
consumption intertemporally in favor of current consumption.  Under uncertainty and in the 
presence of non-insurable income effects, due to the incompleteness of financial markets, there is 
also a state-contingent wealth effect.  Each period that low taxes prevail, households benefit from 
the implicit lower level of government absorption, and this gain is added to their permanent 
income.  This effect favors an increasing consumption path for the duration of the low-tax 
regime, followed by a collapse in consumption when a reversal of the tax cut takes place. 
  The above intuition for the effects of policy uncertainty applies fully in partial   28
equilibrium.  In general equilibrium, a shift from a low to a high tax can also induce a decline in 
the output of nontradables, labor allocation, and relative price of nontradables.  For the price of 
nontradables to fall, the reduction in demand for nontradables induced by the above-mentioned 
wealth and intertemporal substitution effects, must exceed the reduction in supply.  In turn, for 
the supply of nontradables to fall in equilibrium, it must be the case that the combined effect of 
the reduction in the demand for labor (resulting from the reduced value of the marginal product 
of labor in the nontradables sector as p
N falls) and the negative effect of the tax hike on labor 
supply, dominates the positive effect on labor supply resulting from the decline in p
C (which is 
caused by the fall in the relative price of nontradables).  
  The credit channel of the liquidity requirement modifies the model’s business cycle 
transmission mechanism by introducing the following effects in states of nature in which the 
credit constraint binds: 
(a)  The effective real interest rate faced by the small open economy increases because the 
binding borrowing constraint forces households to reduce consumption relative to the case with 
perfect credit markets.  Hence, the collapse in aggregate consumption and in the demand for 
tradables and nontradables associated with adverse real and/or policy shocks is magnified when 
the economy’s response to these shocks triggers the borrowing limit.  
(b)  The effective marginal reward to labor supply increases because the extra unit of labor 
enhances the household’s ability to borrow.  This moderates the negative effects of adverse tax 
and productivity shocks on labor supply. 
(c)  Consumption, saving, and net foreign asset accumulation (and hence the current account) 
exhibit intertemporal distortions that depend on the combined dynamic effects of (a) and (b) in 
general equilibrium.  This is because the effective intertemporal relative price of aggregate   29
consumption is the consumption-based real interest rate,  ()( ) 11 exp( ) 1 / 1
RC C
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which depends on the inverse of the rate of change of the relative price of consumption (which is 
determined by the change in the relative price of nontradables). 
  As a result of the above effects, households face an implicit risk premium in the use of 
foreign debt vis-a-vis their own saving in their efforts to smooth consumption that is analogous 
to the external financing premium faced by firms in models of Sudden Stops based on the 
Bernanke-Gertler financial accelerator.  The differences are in that in the model proposed here 
the equilibrium risk premium is determined endogenously and is influenced by the risk-averse 
nature of the households’ preferences and the economy’s non-insurable aggregate risk.  In 
contrast, in open-economy extensions of the Bernanke-Gertler framework the functional form 
representing the external financing premium in general equilibrium is identical to the partial-
equilibrium solution of a costly-monitoring contracting problem under risk neutrality and 
without aggregate risk. 
  Mendoza (2002) calibrates the liquidity requirements model to Mexican data and 
produces numerical simulations to examine the effects of the borrowing constraint on 
macroeconomic dynamics and welfare.  The calibration parameters are reproduced in Table 1.     
  Figure 4 plots the ergodic distributions of foreign bond holdings with and without the 
liquidity requirement.  The key business-cycle statistical moments of the model’s endogenous 
variables computed using each of the ergodic distributions are listed in Table 2.   Despite the 
marked differences between the two limiting distributions and the first moments, the majority of 
the standard deviations, GDP correlations and first-order autocorrelations show negligible 
differences across the economies with and without the borrowing constraint (except for those 
pertaining to foreign assets and net exports, which the Figure clearly predicts should change   30
dramatically).  Thus, in general the presence of the liquidity requirement does not alter the long-
run business cycle features of the economy.  As argued earlier, this is an important feature of 
models that aim to explain the Sudden Stops as rare events nested within a setup in which 
“regular” business cycles are more common.  But, can the model replicate a Sudden Stop?    
  To answer this question, Figure 5 plots the impact effects of a change from a state of 
nature with high productivity, low world interest rate and low tax rate, or the “best” state, to the 
“worst state” with the opposite features on the model’s endogenous variables as functions of the 
foreign bond position.  The plots show that in the region in which the change from one state to 
the other triggers the borrowing constraint (i.e., where the foreign assets-output ratio rises as the 
foreign asset position falls) the model displays several Sudden Stop features.  In particular, there 
is a large, sudden reversal in the current account, collapses in domestic production and 
consumption, and a sharp decline in the relative price of nontradables.   
  Mendoza (2002) elaborates on the economic forces that explain the markedly non-linear 
pattern of the impact effects by examining the model’s optimality conditions and the distortions 
imposed on them by the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.  Note that within the Sudden 
Stops region, output, consumption, and labor levels always drop and large current account 
reversals always occur, but the relative price of nontradables can fall sharply or increase sharply.  
This feature of the model results from the elastic labor supply that is assigned fully to the 
nontradables sector.  Under these conditions, a Sudden Stop lowers the equilibrium allocations of 
both tradables and nontradables consumption, and hence the relative price of nontradables 
increases or falls depending on which of the two falls by more.  If instead nontradables are 
modeled as being in inelastic supply when the Sudden Stop hits, as in Calvo’s (1988) model, the 
real exchange rate would always fall.  This could be done either by making labor supply inelastic   31
or by assuming that labor is used to produce tradables.  However, the fall in the relative price of 
nontradables could also be obtained under less extreme assumptions (allowing for elastic labor 
even going into both sectors), as long as the contraction in tradables consumption is larger than 
that in nontradables. 
  The effect of precautionary savings on the ergodic distribution of asset holdings in the 
economy with the liquidity requirement is evident in the ergodic distribution of the liquidity-
constrained model (see Figure 4).  Precautionary savings rule out observing states of nature with 
relatively high debt positions in the long run.  In fact, there is only one foreign asset position 
with non-zero long-run probability and a binding borrowing constraint, which shows in the plot 
as the leftmost spike in the limiting distribution.  Interestingly, the liquidity requirement imposes 
directly a constraint on the debt-to-GDP ratio but this yields optimizing behavior that shows in 
the ergodic distribution of foreign assets as equivalent to a long-run constraint on a maximum 
level of debt.  The reason is again precautionary savings: households maintain a buffer stock of 





- because of 
the curvature of the period utility function.  In particular, they do not want to be exposed to the 
risk that this argument could become infinitesimally small (i.e., marginal utility grows infinitely 
large) when the income realization is low, initial debt is high and the borrowing constraint 
suddenly binds.  Hence, they build up precautionary savings up to the point that at equilibrium 
the long-run level of bond holdings is above a minimum such that this is not possible under any 
triple y. 
  Precautionary savings does not imply that the economy jumps immediately out of initial 
high-debt regions in the short run.  Figures 6 and 7 show the transitional dynamics of the 
conditional distribution of bond holdings starting from the largest debt position for s = 2 and s =   32
5.  With s = 2, the economy transitions out of the Sudden Stop range in about 6 quarters, but 
with s = 5 it takes about 50 quarters. The economy can take quite a while to build up the buffer 
stock of saving that allows it to part from the region of the state space in which it is exposed to 
Sudden Stops triggered by binding borrowing constraints resulting from productivity, interest-
rate and tax shocks.  These transitional dynamics reflect the fact that, even though the model 
behaves in the long run as if it featured a maximum debt constraint, this constraint is not binding 
in the short run for optimal decision rules starting from initial conditions with high debt. 
4.2  Margin Requirements, Transactions Costs and Asset Prices 
  The next application incorporates the use of a borrower’s assets as collateral.   As 
mentioned earlier, one type of collateral constraints is the one studied by Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997), in which collateral is in the form of assets subject to a credible threat of confiscation by 
lenders in the event of default (with the credibility of the threat hinging on institutional 
arrangements that do allow lenders to confiscate assets).  In this setting, lenders never lend more 
than the expected discounted liquidation value of the collateral.  A second type of collateral 
constraints widely used in financial markets is in the form of margin requirements, which differ 
from K-M constraints in two key features.  First, custody of the collateral is passed onto creditors 
when the debt is contracted, so there is no uncertainty regarding the lenders ability to confiscate 
the assets and the liquidation price.  Second, the collateral constraint is set in terms of the current 
(or end-of-period) liquidation value of the collateral.  Thus, a decline in asset prices triggers a 
“margin call” by which lenders require borrowers to fill in a gap between the contracted margin 
requirement and the market value of the collateral under the lenders’ control.  If borrowers fail to 
meet the call, lenders have the right to liquidate the assets.  Some margin requirements exist as a 
regulatory practice by government agencies supervising financial intermediaries, others are set as   33
clauses of credit contracts.  Value-at-risk collateralization, in which lenders require collateral to 
cover worst-case-scenario losses are also a form of margin requirements. 
  Margin requirements on a subset of financial market participants in an environment of 
otherwise frictionless and efficient asset markets would be harmless from a macroeconomic 
standpoint.   At least two additional asset-market frictions are needed to allow margin constraints 
to have non-trivial effects on intertemporal plans and asset prices.  First, short positions must be 
constrained.  If an agent faces a binding borrowing limit in the credit market, but borrowing by 
taking a sufficiently large short position on assets is feasible, any potentially binding credit 
constraint can be undone by setting debt to zero and going short on assets.  Second, for asset 
prices to fall when margin constraints bind for some agents there must be frictions affecting asset 
trading.  If a borrower’s assets are sold to meet a margin call but aggregate asset demand is 
infinitely elastic at the fundamentals level, as it would be in a frictionless environment, the 
margin sale can be executed and the collateral restored without a drop in the asset price. 
  Consider an economy with similar preferences and technology as in the liquidity-
requirements model but modified to introduce margin requirements and asset trading costs.  This 
model economy is a variation of a heterogeneous-agents model with two agents: a small open 
economy and a representative foreign securities firm specialized in trading the equity of the 
small open economy.  Since there is also a global credit market determining the world real 
interest rate on bonds, relative to which both the small open economy and the securities firm are 
very small, the large pool of lenders in world credit markets can be interpreted as representing a 
trivial third set of agents. 
  Firms producing inside the small open economy are the same as before, assuming now 
only a single tradable commodity for simplicity.  Hence, the conditions that determine the   34
demand for labor and dividends payments are standard marginal productivity conditions: 
 exp( ) ( , ) tt n t wF k n e =  (11) 
 exp( ) ( , ) tt k t dF k n e =  (12) 
for  t=0,…,¥. 
Preferences are the one-good version of those used in the liquidity-requirements model, 








 corresponds now to consumption of a single 
tradable good.  Households maximize lifetime utility subject to this budget constraint: 
  11 () tt tt t t tt t t t ck d w n q k b b R aa a ++ =+ +-- +  (13) 
where  t a  and  1 t a +  are beginning and end-of-period shares of the time-invariant domestic capital 
stock owned by domestic households and qt is the price of equity.  For simplicity, the world’s 
risk-free gross real interest rate is now assumed to be deterministic and tax shocks are ignored. 
  The margin requirement imposes the following borrowing constraint on households: 
  11 ,01 tt t bq k ka k ++ ³- £ £  (14) 
This constraint limits the extent to which the small open economy can leverage its external debt 
position in the bond market using its equity holdings.  The debt cannot exceed the fraction k  of 
the value of end-of-period equity holdings. Note that, given the budget constraint (13), the 
margin constraint is equivalent to a flow constraint requiring that a fraction 1-k of the economy’s 
equity purchases be paid out of current saving (i.e.,  1 () ( 1 ) ttt t tt tt t t kd q w n b R c q k ak a + ++ + - ³ - ). 
  In addition to the budget constraint and the margin requirement, the small open economy 
faces a constraint that imposes a lower bound on its equity position  1 t a c + ³  for   1 c -¥ < <  for 
1,..., t =¥ .  As explained earlier, this lower-bound constraint is needed to ensure that the state   35
space of the small open economy’s optimization problem is compact and that the margin 
requirement is not irrelevant.  A short-selling constraint is represented by  0 c £  while 01 c <<  
can be interpreted as a portfolio requirement. 
  The optimality conditions of the maximization problem faced by households and firms in 
the small open economy imply that the equilibrium of the labor market, factor payments, and the 
level of output are determined by a set of static equilibrium conditions independent of the 
intertemporal elements of the model (particularly the dynamics of debt, equity and equity prices).  
This is because (a) the GHH specification of the argument of u(.) and v(.) imply that the marginal 
rate of substitution between c and n depends on n only, so labor supply is just a function of the 
real wage and does not shift with c, and (b) the demand for labor is given by the standard 
marginal productivity condition (11).  These static labor demand and supply conditions 
determine the equilibrium sequences of wt, nt, and exp(et)F(k,nt) and given those condition (12) 
determines the equilibrium sequence of dt.  All of these sequences are stochastic because of the 
Markov process driving e. 
  The representative foreign securities firm maximizes the present discounted value of the 
stream of dividends that it pays to its global shareholders.  These firms are assumed to incur two 
types of costs in trading the small open economy’s equity: recurrent and per-trade costs.  These 
represent the costs that the firm incurs in gathering and processing information particular to the 
small open economy.  Per-trade transactions costs are a common feature of the quantitative asset 
pricing literature (e.g, Heaton and Lucas (1996)).  Recurrent costs are added to capture the notion 
that with regard to emerging markets, foreign traders face non-trivial recurrent costs to follow 
economic, political and social developments in the countries they invest in. 
Calvo and Mendoza (2000b) argue that an arrangement where a pool of largely   36
uninformed global investors invest in informed securities firms, that specialize in emerging 
markets and pay information costs, may be an endogenous feature of globalized financial 
markets.  The reason is that in a world with short-selling constraints, a global investor’s gain of 
acquiring country-specific information falls as the number of markets in which to invest grows. 
  The problem of the foreign traders is to choose  1 t a
*
+  for  1,..., t =¥  so as to maximize: 
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where  0 1 M
* º  and Mt
* for  1,..., t =¥  are the exogenous stochastic discount factors representing 
the trader’s opportunity cost of funds or (at equilibrium) the marginal rates of substitution 
between ct and c0 for the hypothetical world “representative client” of foreign securities firms.  
Since these firms are very small compared to the size of the global credit market, and since the 
model abstracts from collateral constraints on foreign traders, setting 
t
t M R
*- =  is a reasonable 
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 are a function of the size of the trades 
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+ - and of a recurrent entry cost q .  Even if the firm does not trade, it incurs each period 








.  The parameter a is a “speed-of-adjustment” 
coefficient governing marginal transactions costs. 
Define the fundamentals equity price 
f
t q  as the conditional expected value of the stream 













èø å .  It follows from the optimality conditions of the foreign trader’s 
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Thus, foreign securities firms follow a partial-portfolio-adjustment rule by which their demand 
for equity is an increasing function of the percent deviation of the fundamentals equity price 
from the actual equity price.  The price elasticity of this demand function is approximated by 1/a.   
  Given the probabilistic processes of the exogenous shocks and the initial conditions 
(b0 0 0*), a competitive equilibrium for this model is defined by sequences of state-contingent 
allocations [ct,nt,bt+1 t+1 t+1] and prices [wt, dt, qt]  for t=0,…,VXFKWKDWDGRPHVWLFILUPV
maximize dividends subject to the CRS production technology, taking factor and goods prices as 
given, (b) households maximize expected utility subject to the budget constraint, the margin 
constraint, and the short-selling constraint, taking as given factor prices, goods prices, the world 
interest rate and the price of equity, (c) foreign securities firms maximize the expected present 
value of dividends net of the trading costs, taking as given equity prices, and (d) the market-
clearing conditions for equity, labor, and goods markets hold. 
  How do margin constraints and trading costs affect equilibrium asset prices and 
macroeconomics dynamics?  While the lack of closed-form solutions imply that this question 
cannot be fully answered analytically, it is still possible to derive useful analytical results by 
examining the Euler equations for bonds and equity of the small open economy and the partial-
adjustment rule of foreign traders. 
The Euler equations for bt+1 and at+1 in the small open economy can be manipulated to 
yield “partial-equilibrium” expressions for excess returns and equity prices as perceived by 
residents of this economy.  These expressions are analogous to standard results from asset-























éù -= ëû  (17) 
Here,  lt is the Lagrange multiplier on the small open economy’s budget constraint (i.e., the 
lifetime marginal utility of ct), ht is the multiplier on the margin requirement, ut is the multiplier 
on the short-selling constraint, and  () 11 1 /
q
tt t t Rd q q ++ + º+  is the return on equity.   
Clearly, if the margin and short-selling constraints never bind, the expected excess return 
that households require to hold equity is determined by the negative of the covariance between 
R
q
t+1 and lt+1, as in standard asset pricing models.  If both constraints bind at date t they affect 
expected excess returns via the direct and indirect effects identified by Heaton and Lucas (1996).  
The direct effects are given by ht(1-k) and -ut/qt.  A binding margin constraint increases the 
excess return by the amount ht(1-k).  A binding short-selling constraint reduces the excess return 
by ut/qt.  The indirect effects depend on how the reduced ability to smooth consumption implied 
by these two frictions alters the covariance between the marginal utility of consumption and the 
return on equity.  The covariance is negative for risky assets like equity, and it becomes more 
negative in the presence of frictions hampering consumption smoothing (although the resulting 
effect on unconditional excess returns has been found to be small in quantitative applications like 
that of Heaton and Lucas).  







tt t t j t i
ij





ç÷ éù = êú ëû ç÷ êú ëû èø
åÕ  (18) 
 where the sequence of Et[R
q
t+1+j] is given by (17).  Thus, a binding margin requirement at any 
date t+j for j³0 increases the expected return on equity that agents in the small open economy   39
use to discount the future stream of dividends, and hence reduces their valuation of equity at t.  
Interestingly, date-t equity prices fall whenever agents expect that there can be margin calls in 
the future, even if the margin constraint does not bind at t (a result first noted in the closed-
economy model of margin requirements by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999)). 
It follows from the above results that when a margin call takes place, agents in the small 
open economy rush to sell equity and adjust their debt position, and thus the equity premium 
they require increases.  Since they meet in the equity market with foreign traders who are willing 
to buy the equity only if the price falls below the fundamentals level, the equilibrium equity price 
falls.  However, this makes the margin constraint even more binding, triggering another round of 
margin calls in a downward spiral reminiscent of Irving Fisher’s classic debt deflation 
mechanism. 
By inverting the foreign traders demand function in (16), and imposing the market-
clearing condition in the equity market,  1 tt aa
* += for all t, one finds that at equilibrium equity 
prices must satisfy  () 1 1
f
tt tt qq a aa q + =+ - + éù ëû .  Thus, the magnitude of the equity price 
decline is larger the lower the elasticity of the foreign traders’ demand curve (i.e., the higher is 
a).  This is because the higher is a the more the equity price needs to fall in order to entice 
foreign traders to buy the equity that the small open economy wishes to sell.  As argued earlier, if 
their demand were infinitely elastic (i.e., a=0), the small open economy could reduce its equity 
holdings without lowering the price.  Note also that, since the short-selling constraint imposes a 
lower bound on equity prices, the equity price collapse in response to a margin call is larger the 
larger the excess of initial equity holdings relative to the level of the short-selling constraint (i.e., 
the larger is  t a c -  ). This is because a binding short-selling constraint limits the magnitude of 
the “fire sale” of equity that the small open economy can undertake.  If the constraint binds, so   40
1 t a c + = , the fire sale of equity is larger the larger at is relative to c.  If at=c, no equity can be 
sold and the equilibrium market price must remain at 
f
t q .  
The recurrent trading costs also play an important role in the model’s dynamics.  If 
t
t M R
*- =  and equity is a risky asset for the small open economy, a model with q=0 ends up in 
the long run with foreign traders owning the maximum equity that the short-selling constraint on 
domestic residents allows them to own (1-c).  This occurs because for any initial at, the fact that 
equity is a risky asset for the small open economy implies that its valuation of equity is lower 
than that implied by discounting dividends at the risk free rate (i.e., lower than qt 
f).  However, at 
a price lower than qt 
f the foreign trader is always buying equity.  Hence, if an equilibrium exists, 
it will be at a price at which the small open economy sets at+1<at.  Thus, in the long run 
domestic residents always hit the short selling constraint.  On the other hand, if q>0 the equity 
price at which foreign traders chose a stationary equity position is lower than the fundamentals 
price, making it possible to obtain states of nature in which domestic agents may set at+1³at at 
the equilibrium price. 
The competitive equilibrium of this model is solved by reformulating it in recursive form 
and applying a recursive numerical solution method.  To represent the equilibrium in recursive 
form, define a and b as the endogenous state variables and e  as the exogenous state.  The state 
space of equity positions spans the discrete interval [c, a
max] with NA elements and the state 
space of debt position spans the discrete interval [b
min, b
max] with NB elements.  The endogenous 
state space is thus defined by the discrete set 
max min max ,, Zb b ca éù é ù =´ ëû ë û  of NAxNB elements.   
Productivity shocks follow an asymptotically-stationary, two-point Markov chain with 
realizations  H  and  L, so the exogenous state space is defined by E ^ H L}.  Since equilibrium   41
wages, dividends and factor payments depend only on the realization of e, these equilibrium 
outcomes can be expressed by the functions w(e), d(e) and n(e).   
Assume a continuous, nonnegative equity pricing function that is taken as given by 
foreign traders and the small open economy.  This conjectured pricing function maps the state 
space into equity prices  ( , , ): qb E ZR ae
+ ´® .  For any initial state  Ee), the conjecture must 
satisfy 
min max (,,) (,) , (,) qb q q a e ae ae éù Îëû , where  ()
min(,) () 1
f qq a ae e a c q =+ - + éù ëû and 
()
max max (,) () 1
f qq a ae e a a q éù =+ - + ëû  are the maximum and minimum equity prices along the 
foreign traders’ demand curve for an initial state with equity holdings   and productivity shock e.  
These bounds of the pricing function follow from the fact that when the small open economy hits 
either the short selling constraint or the upper bound 
max , the foreign traders are at the “short 
side” of the market (assuming the equity demand curves of both players are well-behaved with 
the one of the foreign traders always flatter than that of the small open economy).   
Imposing market clearing in the equity market, the conjectured pricing function and the 
foreign trader’s partial-adjustment decision rule can be combined to formulate the following 
conjectured transition equation for equity holdings: 
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Taking as given the above conjectured transition equation and pricing function, and the 
equilibrium functions for factor payments and labor allocations, the dynamic programming 
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 subject to: 
  [] ˆ () ()() (,,) (,,) ck d w n q b k b b b R ae ee a ea a a e ¢¢ =+ + - - +  (21) 
  ˆ (,,) (,,) bq b b k ka e a a e ¢¢ ³-  (22) 
The solutions to this problem represent optimal consumption and bond accumulation choices by 
the small open economy for any given conjectured pricing function and corresponding equity 
transition equation.  These optimal plans can then be used together with the asset pricing 
formulas in (17) and (18) to compute the actual equity pricing function,  (,,) qb ae % , at which the 
small open economy would agree to the trades implicit in the conjectured pricing and equity 
transition equations in a competitive equity market.  In general, for an arbitrary initial 
conjectured pricing function, the conjectured and the actual equity pricing functions will differ.  
An updated conjectured pricing function can then be created using a Gauss-Seidel algorithm 
until the distance between the two functions satisfies a reasonable convergence criterion.
6 
  The optimal decision rules obtained after the conjectured and actual pricing functions 
converge constitute a recursive competitive equilibrium for the model.  In a recursive 
equilibrium, the optimal rules determining equity holdings, bond holdings, consumption, labor, 
wages, dividends, foreign equity holdings and the equity pricing function are such that: (a) given 
equity prices, wages and dividends, the policy functions for c, b¢, a¢ and n solve the 
maximization problems of households and firms in the small open economy, (b) given equity 
                                                           
6Since this “hog cycle” algorithm is not a contraction mapping, the Gauss-Siedel algorithm uses 
dampening and extrapolation corrections to improve accuracy and avoid exploding cycles.   43
prices and dividends, the policy function for a¢ * solves the maximization problem of foreign 
traders, and (c) the market-clearing conditions for equity, goods and labor markets hold.
7   
  This model is calibrated and solved in Mendoza and Smith (2001) using similar 
parameters as in Mendoza (2002).  The experiments conducted here use the same calibration and 
discretized state space.  Mendoza and Smith constructed a benchmark calibration in which an 
RBC-like calibration exercise determines the values of the parameter set ((,F,$,*,R) and the 
properties of the Markov process of productivity shocks.  The parameters values are g=0.341, 
s=1.1, b=0.04518, d=2 and R=1.065
1/4.  The values of g, b and R are derived from Mexican 
data (see Mendoza and Smith for details).  The value of s is in line with values used in the RBC 
literature, although it is lower than available estimates for Mexico.  The value of d is set to yield 
unitary wage elasticity in labor supply.  The standard deviation of productivity shocks is set to 
match that of Mexico’s GDP of tradable goods in quarterly data (3.36%), and the transition 
probability matrix is assumed to be symmetric with a conditional probability of switching states 
set to match the first-order-autocorrelation of Mexico’s tradables output (0.553).  The values of 
the financial frictions parameters (6,P,a,2) are set first to baseline values such that the margin 
constraint is not binding in all of ExZ, and then 6 is increased to obtain a binding margin 
constraint.  The baseline values are q=0, a=0.001 and c=0.8742, which support unconstrained 
equilibrium allocations with any k$0.011 for grids with 130 evenly-spaced bond positions in the 
                                                           
7 This is easy to prove noting that: (i) the Benveniste-Sheinkman equation applied to problem 
(20) yields the same Euler equation for bond holdings as the households maximization problem, 
(ii) by construction, the implied equity prices ensure that at equilibrium the households’ Euler 
equation for equity holdings also holds (up to the error allowed by the convergence criterion), 
(iii) the wage, dividend and labor functions reflect optimal decisions by households and domestic 
firms, (iv) the conjectured transition equation for equity holdings ensures that the trades 
undertaken at the equilibrium equity prices solve the maximization problem of foreign traders, 
and (v) the constraints (21) and (22) combined with results (i)-(iv) ensure that the market   44
interval [-0.634, 5.691] and 76 evenly-spaced equity positions in the interval [0.874,0.969].  The 
simulation with binding margin requirements uses k=0.009.  
The simulations reviewed below differ from those in Mendoza and Smith (2001) in two 
respects.  First, Mendoza and Smith implemented a different solution method that does not use a 
conjectured transition equation for asset holdings in the small open economy, but instead solves 
separately for equity and bond decisions rules for the small open economy and foreign traders, 
and iterates to convergence on a conjectured pricing function that clears the equity market.   
Second, Mendoza and Smith focused on solutions for the case in which Mt
* is set so that in the 
absence of financial frictions no equity trading takes place at equilibrium, instead of setting the 
traders’ stochastic discount factors to match the world interest rate.  The no-trading equilibrium 
is computed by solving the dynamic programming problem of the small open economy imposing 
stationary equity holdings, calculating the corresponding stochastic discount factors Mt for the 
households of that economy, and then setting Mt
*=Mt .   
The manifolds of the optimal decision rule for bond holdings in economies with and 
without margin constraints (for the low realization of the shock) are plotted in Figure 8.  
Manifolds of the corresponding equity prices are plotted in Figure 9.   Note that in the manifolds 
for the margin-constrained economy there is a “low-wealth” triangular valley that should be 
ignored because a and b are too low for the non-negativity constraint on the argument of utility 
to be satisfied together with the margin constraint.  In each plot, this area is set to show values of 
the variable being plotted equal to the value that corresponds to the lowest (a,b) pair for which a 
solution satisfying the non-negativity constraint exists.        
Figure 8 shows that, even in this experiment with a very high elasticity in the equity 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
clearing conditions, the households’ budget constraint, and the margin constraint are satisfied.   45
demand of foreign traders (at a=0.001 the elasticity is 1000) and no recurrent trading costs, the 
suddenly-binding margin constraint alters significantly foreign asset holdings.  The difference in 
bond positions is striking, as the decision rule changes from a smooth, increasing function of a 
and b to a non-linear function with a sharp jump at the point in which debt is sufficiently high for 
the margin constraint to bind.  The jump is larger the higher is a because these are also the states 
in which the equity price falls by more (see Figure 9), and hence the Fisherian effect inducing 
tighter margin constraints in response to falling asset prices is stronger.  However, the equity 
price collapses were bound to be quantitatively small given that the very high elasticity of the 
foreign traders’ demand for equity implies that their demand curve is almost horizontal at the 
level of the fundamentals price. 
The impact effects on consumption and the current account-output ratio in response to a 
switch from the high productivity state to the low productivity state are plotted in Figures 10 and 
11 respectively.   Figure 10, in combination with Figures 8 and 9, shows a key difference 
between this application and the liquidity requirements model: with two assets to allocate 
savings into, agents have an extra degree of freedom in their efforts to mitigate the consumption 
effect of a binding borrowing constraint.  As Figure 10 shows, in states in which debt is high 
enough for the constraint to bind but initial equity holdings are large, agents manage to keep a 
relatively smooth consumption path (despite the large adjustments in both equity prices and bond 
holdings shown in Figures 8 and 9).  In states in which agents have a low equity position, 
consumption falls sharply.  The largest consumption declines are observed when the margin 
constraint switches from nonbonding to binding when the productivity shock hits, they can reach 
up to 11.5 percent.  Figure 11 shows a similar pattern for the response of the current account-
output ratio.  Small reversals of current account deficits occur in response to the productivity   46
shock in the area of the state space in which the consumption impact effect is modest, but 
reversals of up to 2.5 percentage points of GDP are possible when the consumption decline is at 
its maximum.   Mendoza (2002) is taking this analysis further to examine the implications of 
varying the elasticity of the trader’s demand curve, the size of recurrent costs, and the coefficient 
of the margin requirement, as well as introducing interest-rate and tax shocks similar to those 
used in the model with liquidity requirements. 
4.3  Borrowing Constraints Enforcing Participation Constraints 
Liquidity requirements and collateral constraints are features of a variety of private credit 
contracts but when it comes to instruments like sovereign debt there is very limited scope for 
enforcing contracts featuring those constraints.  In this context, a modeling approach based on 
willingness-to-pay considerations seems an appealing alternative.  Hence, in this application we 
study a small open economy that faces a standard credit-market participation constraint.  In case 
of default, the country is punished by permanent exclusion of world financial markets, so default 
is optimal whenever the expected lifetime utility of staying in a credit relationship exceeds that 
of living permanently under financial autarky.   
The analysis conducted here differs from those in Kehoe and Levine (1993), 
Kocherlakota (1996), Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) in that the model 
retains the asset-market incompleteness of the small-open-economy RBC setting, in contrast with 
the complete-contingent-claims markets assumed in those studies (which were not aimed at 
explaining Sudden Stops but at studying equilibria in which there can be as much risk sharing as 
possible given that participation constraints are satisfied).  As Alvarez and Jermann (2000) 
showed, the equilibrium with participation constraints and complete markets can be 
decentralized with financial markets that feature endogenous, state-contingent limits on short   47
positions for state-contingent assets.  Interestingly, the incomplete-markets, small open economy 
RBC model with a participation constraint can also be represented as an economy that faces an 
endogenous borrowing constraint, but with the caveat that the constraint is not state contingent.  
This brings the model closer to the analysis of participation constraints under incomplete markets 
by Zhang (1997) than to the models in the Kehoe-Levine-Kocherlakota line. 
In the model we review below, precautionary savings interact with default incentives to 
give rise to the endogenous non-state-contingent borrowing constraint, which ensures that agents 
have incentives to repay their debts, and thus enforces the participation constraint.  The 
borrowing constraint is determined by the highest level of foreign asset holdings for which the 
expected lifetime utility of staying in a credit relationship is equal to the expected lifetime utility 
of autarky across all productivity states of nature.  This is the case because the model’s only 
financial asset is the non-contingent bond and the decision to default is made one period in the 
future.  In this environment, lenders seeking to enforce participation constraints in all states of 
nature need to set a borrowing limit equal to the maximum bt+1 among those for which 
repayment and autarky values are equalized across all realizations of the productivity shock 
tomorrow.  As a consequence, the borrowing constraint cannot vary with the state of nature. 
Consider a one-sector small open economy model similar in structure to the one 
examined in the previous application.  The small open economy can be viewed as a 
representative-agent economy facing a labor/leisure choice and non-diversifiable, idiosyncratic 
income risk.  Labor allocations, dividends and wages are still governed by the same equilibrium 
functions of the productivity state w(e), d(e) and n(e).  The utility function changes only in that it 
features now a constant discount factor.  Thus, this application obtains a well-defined limiting 
distribution of foreign assets for the small open economy, even in the absence of the participation   48
constraint, via precautionary savings, as in the canonical model of Aiyagari (1994) with an 
exogenous borrowing constraint.  This requires the condition  (1 ) 1 r b +< . 
The households’ budget constraint is: 
  1 ttt t t t t cdw nb b R + =+ - +  (23) 
This constraint differs from the one in (13) only in that domestic agents are owners of the entire 
domestic capital stock (with k=1 without loss of generality).  
The small open economy also faces a standard participation constraint that ensures that it 
always has the incentive to repay its external debt:  
  1, 1 1 () ( )
AUT
tt t Vb V ee ++ + ³   for all  11 , tt b e ++  (24) 
The value of autarky in the right-hand-side of (24) is state-dependent since it measures 
the expected utility of the optimal consumption-labor path obtained when consumption is set 
equal to domestic output at all times, and both labor and output vary with the productivity shock.  
Under autarky, the small open economy cannot smooth period utility because there are no 
international financial assets available to facilitate consumption smoothing after it goes in 






















   The competitive equilibrium for this economy is defined by sequences of state contingent 
allocations and prices  ,1 ,, tt t t cn b w + éù ëû  for   T d  such that: (a) domestic firms maximize 
profits given their production technology, taking factor prices as given, (b) households maximize 
expected lifetime utility subject to their budget constraint and participation constraint, taking as   49
given factor prices and the world interest rate, (c) international lenders agree to loan contracts 
that enforce participation constraints, and (d) the goods and labor markets clear. 
Given that the value function in the left-hand-side of (24) is increasing and concave in 
foreign bond holdings, one can translate the participation constraint into an endogenous 
constraint setting a maximum amount of debt (or minimum level of bond holdings), B , that 
guarantees that condition (24) holds regardless of the realization of the productivity shock: 
  { } max ( ): ( , ) ( )
AUT bB b V b V
e
ee e ¢³= =  (26) 
This borrowing constraint ensures that the only permissible values of b¢ at equilibrium are those 
greater or equal to the largest one, across all productivity states of nature, for which the value of 
debt repayment equals the value of living in financial autarky. 
Clearly, the level of the borrowing constraint is determined by the default incentives of 
the small open economy (i.e., by the autarky and continuation values).  However, it is not 
straightforward to know how the gap between these two values depends on preferences, 
technology, initial debt, and the stochastic structure of productivity shocks.   However, it is 
important to separate this question (i.e., how is B  determined) from the question of whether this 
model can reproduce Sudden Stops (i.e., situations in which the borrowing constraint switches 
from nonbonding to binding as the productivity shock switches from high to low).  OnceB  is set, 
the model’s solution is identical to that of a small open economy model with an exogenous, 
state- and time-invariant lower bound on foreign assets that just happens to have been set at  B .  
This yields similar incentives for precautionary savings and long-run distributions of assets as 
the Aiyagari (1994) incomplete-markets model with exogenous borrowing constraints.  In 
particular, the decision rule  (,) bb e ¢  first equals B  for low values of b and all values of e, then at 
some level of b (which is lower for lower values of e) it hits a kink and slopes upward for higher   50
values of b.  This allows for the possibility that there can be a range of values of b for which the 
borrowing constraint does not bind if productivity is high but it becomes binding if productivity 
is low, and in this range the model will display Sudden Stop effects. 
The non-state-contingent nature of B  does limit this model ’s ability to yield short-term 
dynamics in which the real effects of Sudden Stops can be very large and prevents it from 
producing outcomes in which the likelihood of Sudden Stops may persist several quarters.  The 
reason is that, in contrast with the previous two applications in which the borrowing constraint 
varies with the state (either with GDP in units of tradables or with the end-of-period liquidation 
value of equity), here the constraint is always B .  The economy cannot be assumed to start from 
higher debt positions because, by backward induction, this would imply that at some point in the 
past lenders agreed to debt contracts that did not support the participation constraint.  Even if 
they did, the reversal to B  would take place in one shot.  
The manner in which default incentives are influenced by preferences, existing debt and 
the Markov structure of shocks is also worth further discussion.  The effect of initial debt is 
obvious: since the value of repayment is increasing in b, the incentive for default is always 
higher the higher the level of debt the country has acquired. The effects of the productivity 
shocks are easiest to study in the case of a two-point, symmetric Markov chain, with high and 
low shocks denoted 
l e and 
h e respectively, such that 
hl ee e =- =  and the variance of the shocks 
is e 
2.  In this case, the value of repayment is low, the lower the realization of the productivity 
shock and the higher the conditional probability of continuing in the low state of the shock.  The 
value of autarky is high, the higher the productivity shock and the higher the conditional 
probability of continuing in the high state of the shock.   For given conditional probabilities (i.e., 
given the persistence of the productivity disturbances), higher variance increases debt repayment   51
incentives, since higher variance increases the benefit of using international debt as a means to 
smooth consumption.   
The households’ coefficient of relative risk aversion matters for default incentives 
because it influences the curvature of the utility and value functions.  For low values of this 
curvature parameter, the borrowing constraint that supports the participation constraint tends to 
correspond to the level of debt at which repayment and autarky values are equal when the 
productivity shock is high.  In this case, incentives to default are higher in good productivity 
states.  However, for sufficiently-high relative risk aversion, everything else the same, the 
borrowing constraint that supports the participation constraint is the level of debt at which 
repayment and autarky values are equal when the productivity shock is low.  The intuition is that 
with greater curvature in utility, an agent hit by a negative productivity shock has a higher 
marginal utility of lower consumption and is thus more willing to default to get a higher 
consumption level under autarky, than an agent with less curvature in utility. 
The controversial implication derived from these arguments is that the model can easily 
predict that, looking at a cross section of small open economies all assumed to be identical in 
preferences and technology, those with more macroeconomic volatility (i.e., higher income 
variability) should be observed to be the ones with a higher capacity to borrow (or with lower 
values of B ).  This is because the high-volatility economies enjoy more benefits from being able 
to smooth consumption using the global credit market and thus have less incentives to default.   
Note, however, that higher volatility by itself is not sufficient to ensure that the borrowing 
constraint of a high-volatility country will be set at a higher level than for a low-volatility 
country because this depends on the combination of the preference, technology and stochastic 
factors mentioned above.   52
The solution method used to solve this model is a policy function iteration algorithm that 
solves recursively for the endogenous borrowing constraint defined in (26).  We start with a 
guess of B  and solve the model via policy function iteration on the bond holding decision rules 
in the corresponding Euler equation.  We then calculate the value of expected lifetime utility 
given the optimal decision rules for the given guessed value of B  and the utility of autarky, and 
evaluate whether the preset borrowing constraint is the least tight that enforces the participation 
constraint in all productivity states.  If it is not, we find the levels of bond holdings that support 
the participation constraints with equality for all states, and choose the maximum among these as 
the new guess of B .  The iterations continue until the guess value of B  set in the first step 
equals the endogenous constraint computed in the last step.  This method is very similar to the 
one employed by Zhang (1997). 
The numerical results reported below illustrate some of the properties of the model 
explained in the previous paragraphs.   Results are reported for two experiments that compare 
repayment incentives and borrowing constraints for economies with risk aversion coefficients set 
at 2 and 5 respectively.  Table 3 presents the parameter values used in the two experiments.  
Figure 12 plots the values of repayment and autarky under high and low productivity states as a 
function of the foreign bond position.  These plots show how in the s=2 case the borrowing 
constraint is set at the level in which repayment and autarky values cross under the high 
productivity state, while for s=5 this happens at the debt position the equates the repayment and 
autarky values under the low productivity state.   
Figure 13 shows the limiting distribution for bond holdings for the economy with s=5, 
which is similar to the ergodic distribution of foreign assets in the liquidity requirements 
economy.  Recall, however, that while there are transitional dynamics in the conditional   53
distributions of foreign assets in the liquidity requirements economy when the simulations start 
from high levels of debt relative to those supported by the ergodic distribution, the model with 
the participation constraint can never start from debt levels higher than -B  because that would 
imply that at the time such high debt was acquired the participation constraint did not hold.  Even 
if one assumed that such an initial high-debt state could be observed, the economy would have to 
jump to B  in one shot.    
Figure 14 shows impact effects on consumption and foreign asset holdings when the 
economy switches from a high productivity shock to a low productivity shock for the s=5 
experiment.  As in the previous applications, a switch from a state where the constraint is not 
binding to a state where it binds has large effects on consumption and foreign asset holdings.  
However, the effects are quantitatively smaller in part because the parameterizations and the 
models themselves are not entirely comparable, but also because the model with the participation 
constraint can only accommodate initial debt positions that satisfy the borrowing constraint B .  
Summing up, the willingness-to-pay model based on a participation constraint under 
incomplete markets can reproduce some features of the crises of emerging markets, but in some 
dimensions it seems to fall behind the ability-to-pay alternatives.  In particular, it can yield a 
counterfactual prediction regarding macroeconomic volatility and the ability to acquire debt in 
global credit markets, and it limits the magnitude and persistence of the Sudden Stops it can 
produce because of its non-state-contingent endogenous borrowing constraint.  At the same time, 
however, this model has the advantage that it endogenously enforces full consistency in the 
incentives of borrowers and lenders, while the previous applications rely on the implicit 
assumption that the frictions they assumed are enough to commit debtors to repay even if debtors 
are in states in which they could be better off living under autarky.   54
4.4 Capital Accumulation, Collateral Constraints and Tobin’s q 
  From the perspective of a business cycle analysis, an important element missing from the 
previous three applications is capital accumulation.  The interaction of credit frictions, the price 
of capital, and the investment process is an important subject to explore as part of the business-
cycle implications of financial-market imperfections. Thus, in this last application we consider a 
full-blown RBC small open economy model with capital accumulation in which foreign debt 
must satisfy a collateral constraint.  The collateral constraint is again in the form of a margin 
requirement set to a fraction of the end-of-period liquidation value of the capital stock.  In this 
environment, the equilibrium price of equity must satisfy the households’ forward-looking asset 
pricing condition as well as the firms’ optimality condition for investment decisions.   
The model shares with the asset-pricing model reviewed earlier, the assumption that a 
margin requirement forces households to keep their debt equal or smaller than a fraction k  of 
the value of the capital stock.  This model differs in that all equity is held by the domestic 
representative agent and capital accumulation is endogenous.  
  Firms in this economy have a more dynamic role than in the previous models.  They 
choose labor and investment to maximize the present value of their profits taking as given wages 
and the cost of funds.  Firms operate a constant-returns-to- scale technology and face convex 
adjustment costs of investment.   Firms choose  t n ,  t i , and  1 t k +  to maximize the expected present 
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where  0 1 R = %  and j R %  for j=1,..,¥  are the stochastic discount factors (or, at equilibrium, the 
marginal rates of substitution in consumption between date j-1 and date j) that represent the cost   55
of funds to firms.  This maximization problem is subject to the standard capital accumulation 
equation: 
  1 (1 ) tt t ik k d + =--  (28) 
Note that equation (27) implicitly assumes that firms cannot borrow directly form abroad 
because profits are not discounted at the world interest rate.  However, the result that at 
equilibrium firms discount profits with the households’ stochastic discount factors implies that 
the model allows for households, who can borrow from abroad and are the owners of the firms, 
to provide financing to firms at the interest rate that they find optimal to do so. 
The first-order conditions of the firm’s problem are: 
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where t q  is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the capital accumulation equation at time t, 
or the firms’ shadow value of investing in one additional unit of capital.  These optimality 
conditions are standard from investment theory.  Equation (29) is the standard labor demand 
condition.  Equation (30) equates the marginal cost of investment with its shadow value, and it 
implies that investment is an increasing function of  t q  because the marginal cost is increasing in 
the investment-capital ratio and capital is predetermined one period in advance.  Equation (31) 
equates the expected discounted marginal return of investment to its shadow value.   
The Euler equation also represents an arbitrage condition in implicit form that equates (at 
equilibrium) the expected marginal gain of adding an extra unit to the capital stock weighed by   56
the households’ stochastic intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption with the 
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, plus capital gains net of depreciation.  The 
forward solution of equation (31) yields an asset-pricing expression for the firm’s valuation of 
























  The households’ optimization problem is to maximize expected lifetime utility (returning 
now to the SCU utility function in equation (1)) subject to the following budget constraint: 
  () 11 (1 ) tt t t t t t t tt t cd q k q kw n bb R d ++ =+ - - + -+ (33) 
The collateral constraint implies that households are allowed to borrow up to a fraction k  of the 
end-of-period value of the capital stock: 
  11 tt t bq k k ++ ³-  (34) 
  The household’s problem yields an asset-pricing condition similar to the one derived in 
application 4.2 (eq. (17)) with an additional depreciation component.  In a decentralized 
competitive equilibrium, households solve their optimization problem taking equity prices, 
dividends and wage rates as given.  Their valuation of equity reflects the expected present 
discounted value of the stream of state-contingent dividends, discounted using the sequence of 
their stochastic discount factors (i.e., the marginal rates of substitution in consumption between 
date t+1+j consumption and date t consumption, for j=0,…,¥, adjusted to take into account the 
states in which the collateral constraint binds).  
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the equity prices resulting from the households’   57
asset-pricing equation must match those obtained from the firm’s investment-demand decision in 
equation (32).  In other words, at equilibrium the sequence of stochastic discount factors of 
households, taken as given by firms in solving their optimization problem, must yield equity 
prices from the firms’ side such that, taken as given those prices, the households’ optimization 
problem yields the same sequence of stochastic discount factors.   
It is possible to use the above characterization of the equilibrium, combined with the 
representative-agent nature of the model, to write down a recursive formulation of the 
competitive equilibrium in the form of a planner’s problem for the small open economy that 
takes as given a conjectured equity price function.  The planner’s problem can be solved 
repeatedly until convergence is attained between the conjectured pricing function and the actual 
prices calculated using the values of the households’ stochastic discount factors obtained each 
time the planner’s problem is solved.  The conjectured pricing function can be updated at each 
stage using a Gauss-Siedel algorithm like the one proposed for application 4.2.  Moreover, the 
investment schedule implied by equation (30) can play the same role played by the trader’s 
partial-portfolio adjustment rule in that other application (i.e., it can be used to build a 
conjectured transition equation for aggregate capital given the conjectured pricing function and 
the initial capital stock). 
Since this model’s collateral constraint is a function of the capital accumulation decision, 
it introduces feedback effects between the constraint (or the incentives to relax it) and the 
production and investment decisions, wage and dividend rates, and the price of capital.  Suppose 
a realization of the exogenous shocks makes the collateral constraint bind.  If equilibrium 
investment declines as households try to reduce their equity stake to lessen the effect of the 
suddenly-binding constraint on consumption, the price of capital falls by equation (30).  This   58
tightens further the constraint producing a Fisherian deflationary effect as in the equity-trading 
model.  In contrast with that model, however, the change in capital accumulation introduces 
effects that persist over time on the ability of the economy to generate income, as the 
independence of the equilibrium paths of labor allocations and wage and dividend rates with 
respect to the credit friction does no longer hold.  We are examining the quantitative implications 
of this model and its ability to explain Sudden Stops in work in progress. 
5.   Conclusions 
  The seven years separating the Mexican financial crisis of December 1994 and the recent 
Argentine crisis witnessed more than a dozen similar financial debacles across the majority of 
the so-called emerging-markets economies.  The novel feature of these crises was that they 
featured four empirical regularities that are now collectively referred to as the Sudden Stop 
phenomenon: a sudden loss of access to international capital markets, a marked reversal of the 
current account deficit, a severe contraction of domestic production and aggregate demand, and a 
collapse in asset prices and in domestic relative prices.  Emerging markets crises also displayed a 
high potential for contagion, as a crisis in one country infected other emerging economies with 
little or no direct economic linkages with the first one. 
  Explaining Sudden Stops poses a serious challenge to international macroeconomic 
theory because their features are seriously at odds with the predictions of the mainstream 
approaches to analyze balance-of-payments crises and economic fluctuations in open economies.  
As a result, a growing literature has produced several alternative theoretical models in which 
financial-market imperfections are put forward as a central element of the transmission 
mechanism that triggers Sudden Stops and contagion of crises across emerging markets.  
Quantitative applications of this financial-frictions approach have lagged behind, however, and   59
hence the potential for this approach to offer a plausible explanation for the Sudden Stops 
phenomenon and a solid basis for policy-evaluation models remains undetermined. 
  This paper surveyed recent developments in an area of quantitative applications of open-
economy equilibrium business-cycle models with financial frictions that aim to fill some of the 
gaps in the literature on emerging markets crises. The applications featured explicit constraints 
on a small open economy’s ability to borrow from international capital markets linked to ability-
to-pay and willingness-to-pay criteria like those at the core of several theoretical and policy 
studies on Sudden Stops.  These borrowing constraints were attached to the optimization 
problems of economic agents acting independently in a decentralized competitive environment, 
and the resulting equilibria were then represented as solutions to recursive planning problems.  
The planning problems were solved with recursive, nonlinear numerical methods that are 
accurate for picking up the kinks in foreign asset decision rules and the implied nonlinearities in 
the adjustment of macroeconomic aggregates caused by suddenly binding borrowing constraints. 
  The first application considers a two-sector variant of the standard RBC model for small 
open economies without capital accumulation in which lenders impose a liquidity requirement 
condition on borrowers, by which they must pay a fraction of their current obligations out of 
current income.  Given the households’ budget constraint, the liquidity requirement is equivalent 
to a borrowing constraint limiting the stock of foreign debt not to exceed a fraction of income.  
The liquidity requirement can thus be interpreted as a tool for reducing the risk of borrowers 
becoming unable to service their debt, and is in line with lending criteria widely applied in credit 
markets (particularly mortgage and consumer credit markets).  The two-sector nature of the 
model plays a key role because foreign debt is denominated in units of tradable goods but part of 
the income on which it is leveraged is generated in the nontradables sector.  This allows the   60
model to capture the “liability-dollarization” problem faced in many emerging markets crises: 
sudden changes in the relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables, or in the income 
generated by the nontradables sector, compromise the ability of borrowers to service debt and 
contribute to magnify the effects of the loss of access to world credit markets. 
  The second application explores equity trading and its connection with access to 
international credit markets in a two-agent stochastic general equilibrium asset-pricing model 
with financial frictions.  The model features a one-good version of the same small open economy 
setup as the first application but modified to allow domestic agents to trade domestic equity 
abroad and to require them to offer their equity holdings as collateral for foreign debt.  Collateral 
is modeled in the form of a margin requirement according to which debt is limited not to exceed 
a fraction of the end-of-period liquidation value of the domestic agents’ equity position.  This 
form of collateral is widely used in international capital markets through value-at-risk 
collateralization or explicit margin call clauses (such as those that featured prominently in the 
contagion of the Russian crisis to financial markets worldwide), and it is also often imposed on 
financial intermediaries by regulatory agencies.  Domestic agents trade equity with specialized, 
value-maximizing foreign securities firms that incur per-trade and recurrent trading costs in 
trading the small open economy’s equity. 
  A margin call in this setup leads domestic agents to engage in a “fire sale” of equity in 
their effort to meet the call and minimize the adverse welfare implications of the suddenly 
binding credit constraint.  However, the trading costs incurred by foreign traders imply that their 
equity demand function is less than infinitely-elastic.  Hence, the fire sale of equity lowers equity 
prices below the fundamentals level and tightens further the borrowing constraint, thereby 
inducing a new round of margin calls in a deflationary spiral reminiscent of the Fisherian debt   61
deflation mechanism. 
  The third application switches from the ability-to-pay frictions examined in the first two 
applications to examine a model with a willingness-to-pay constraint.  In particular, this 
application revisits the one-good RBC small open economy model without capital accumulation 
in an environment in which the economy is required to satisfy a credit market participation 
constraint.  This constraint requires the expected lifetime utility of repaying debts not to fall 
below the expected lifetime utility of moving to financial autarky, under the assumption that the 
latter means permanent exclusion of the global credit market.  A recursive representation of the 
equilibrium of this economy features an endogenous borrowing constraint that does not vary 
over time and across states of nature.  This constraint is set at the highest level of debt at which 
the values of participation and autarky are equalized across all possible realizations of an 
exogenous productivity disturbance. 
  The last application reconsiders collateral constraints in a full-blown RBC small open 
economy with endogenous investment decisions and capital-adjustment costs.  In this case, 
households cannot borrow more than a fraction of the end-of-period liquidation value of the 
capital stock, which is entirely held by domestic agents.  In the recursive competitive 
equilibrium, the optimality conditions of the firms’ investment plans in this Tobin’s q-type 
model can be used to build conjectured functions for the price of capital and the transition 
equation of the aggregate capital stock.  The economy’s optimal consumption and foreign debt 
accumulation plans, given these conjectures, can be solved for repeatedly until convergence is 
achieved between the conjectured capital pricing function and the forward solution for the price 
of capital consistent with the optimal consumption plans. 
  Endogenous capital accumulation adds a vehicle for increasing the persistence of the   62
macroeconomic effects induced by a suddenly binding collateral constraint.  The reason is that  
this model features the standard inverse relationship between the price of capital and the 
investment decision.  Hence, the decline in the price of capital caused by the agents’ rush to 
liquidate capital to relax the collateral constraint leads not only to a Fisherian effect like the one 
in the equity trading application but it also lowers the future capital stock and impairs the 
economy’s ability to generate future wage and dividend income.  The decline in expected 
earnings feeds back into the price equity and thus interacts with the Fisherian effect. 
  Much remains to be done in the task of developing quantitative applications of 
equilibrium business cycle models that can explain the Sudden Stops phenomenon, yet the 
results summarized in this paper suggest that models based on credit frictions can produce large 
current account reversals and collapses in economic activity and prices.  Moreover, the 
precautionary savings channel inherent to all four applications enables the models to be 
consistent with the observation that while Sudden Stops are large and dramatic, and can entail 
large welfare costs (see Mendoza (2001)), they tend to be relatively rare compared with the 
regular business cycle of the economies in question.  In addition, the four applications break 
away from the common assumption in the emerging-markets-crises literature of treating a 
suddenly binding borrowing constraint as an unanticipated surprise to which economic agents 
did not assign some probability of occurrence, however small, in forming their optimal plans.  To 
the contrary, the agents fear of a Sudden Stop influences critically their saving, consumption, 
investment, current account, and portfolio decisions.  It is also worth noting that all four 
applications yield large, nonlinear real effects relying only on credit-market imperfections 
without recourse to nominal rigidities or multiplicity of equilibria driven by exogenous shifts in 
expectations.   63
  The limitations of the four applications suggest two interesting agendas for further 
research.  One relates to exploring the policy implications of the models.  Most of the proposals 
under consideration for reforming the facilities available to a country in crisis through 
international financial organizations are based on the notion that macroeconomic models can be 
counted on to determine “sustainable” current account and debt positions, as well as asset prices 
that reflect “normal” market conditions vis-à-vis prices that reflect “imperfections” resulting 
from moral hazard, informational frictions, or other distortions (see, for example, Calvo (2002) 
and Lerrick and Meltzer (2001)).  Clearly, developing dependable quantitative models to perform 
these tasks hinges on making progress in producing useful quantitative models of Sudden Stops. 
  The second agenda for further research would address several of the weaknesses of the 
applications reviewed in this paper.  The ability-to-pay applications did not fully enforce ability 
to pay criteria and were not concerned with maintaining the borrowers’ incentives to repay their 
debt even if they were able to repay.  It would be interesting to develop quantitative models that 
incorporate both of these features.  The applications also did not take into account credit frictions 
affecting firms directly or foreign traders in the global credit market, differences in the maturity 
of debt contracts, interactions of the credit frictions with government-issued debt instruments and 
monetary distortions, and the endogenous determination of coefficients driving margin and 
liquidity requirements.   Clearly, much remains to be done in the area of developing quantitative 
models for explaining the dynamics of small open economies in the globalized world economy 
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            Table 1.  Parameter Values for the Calibrated Deterministic Stationary State
Technology: Fiscal policy: Credit market:
. 0.364 2 0.079 R 1.016
A 1.958 T traded -0.139 3 0.740
YT 1.000 T nontraded 0.119 b/Y -0.350
Preferences: National accounts ratios:
￿ 0.027 C/Y 0.684 CT/YT 0.665
/ 2.000 I/Y 0.217 GT/YT 0.017
￿ 0.316 G/Y 0.092 IT/YT 0.323
& 0.342 NX/Y -0.001 CN/YN 0.708
1 2.000 YT/YN 0.648 GN/YN 0.141
IN/YN 0.151                 Table 2.  Business Cycle Comovements in  the Limiting Distribution of Model Economies
Standard Dev.
Standard relative to GDP of First-order Correlation with
Mean Deviation nontradables Autocorrelation GDP
Economy with Perfect Credit Markets
Net foreign assets -0.097 0.883 14.274 0.999 0.321
GDP in units of tradables 2.598 7.307 1.829 0.931 1.000
Tradables GDP 1.000 3.368 0.843 0.553 0.387
Nontradables GDP 1.548 3.995 1.000 0.633 0.387
Labor 0.524 5.003 1.252 0.928 0.976
Consumption 0.924 6.254 1.565 0.839 0.823
Consumption of tradables 0.683 10.162 2.544 0.934 0.996
Consumption of nontradables 1.097 5.635 1.411 0.633 0.387
Net Exports 0.002 25.987 6.504 0.623 -0.025
Price of nontradables 1.033 11.925 2.985 0.815 0.874
World real interest rate 1.016 0.880 0.220 0.553 -0.071
Economy with Liquidity Constraint
Net foreign assets 0.258 0.679 10.957 0.999 0.313
GDP in units of tradables 2.612 7.323 1.830 0.931 1.000
Tradables GDP 1.000 3.368 0.842 0.553 0.391
Nontradables GDP 1.549 4.002 1.000 0.633 0.391
Labor 0.525 5.008 1.252 0.928 0.978
Consumption 0.927 6.266 1.566 0.838 0.823
Consumption of tradables 0.688 10.158 2.538 0.934 0.996
Consumption of nontradables 1.098 5.643 1.410 0.633 0.391
Net Exports -0.004 9.150 2.287 0.599 -0.003
Price of nontradables 1.041 11.880 2.969 0.815 0.874
World real interest rate 1.016 0.880 0.220 0.553 -0.069
Note:  All standard deviations are in percent of the corresponding mean, except for the one corresponding to the net
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            Figure 1. Current Account Balances in Percent of Gross Domestic Product


















































1993Q1 1994Q1 1995Q1 1996Q1 1997Q1 1998Q1 1999Q1 2000Q1 2001Q1             Figure 2. Annual Growth Rates in Real Private Consumption Expenditures
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Figure 5.  Impact Effects of a Shift from "Best" to ""Worst" State
(as a function of the foreign asset grid)Figure 6. Transition Distributions of Net Foreign Assets in Liquidity Constrained Economy
with Risk Aversion Coefficient Set at 2.0



















2 quarters 4 quarters 6 quartersFigure 7. Transition Distributions of Net Foreign Assets in Liquidity Constrained Economy
with Risk Aversion Coefficient set at 5.

























2 quarters 6 quarters 10 quarters 20 quarters 50 quartersFigure 8.  Foreign Bond Decision Rules for Economies with and without Margin Requirements in Low Productivity State
(as functions of the (a,b) pairs in the discretized state space Z)
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4Figure 9.  Equity Prices for Economies with and without Margin Requirements in Low Productivity State
(as functions of the (a,b) pairs in the discretized state space Z)
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32.416Figure 10.  Impact Effects on Consumption in Response to a Shift from High to Low Productivity States
(as functions of the (a,b) pairs in the discretized state space Z)
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0.35Figure 11.  Impact Effects on the Current Account-Output Ratio in Response to a Shift from High to Low Productivity States
(as functions of the (a,b) pairs in the discretized state space Z)
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Figure 12. Lifetime Utilities as Functions of Bond Positions
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Figure 13. Limiting Distribution of Foreign Assets in the Economy with Participation Constraints
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